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Pangloss explained to him how everything was for the best. Jac-
ques was not of this opinion.
"Men," said he, "must have corrupted nature a little, for they
were not born wolves, and they have become wolves. God did
not give them twenty-four-pounder cannons or bayonets, and
they have made bayonets and cannons to destroy each other. I
might bring bankruptcies into the account and Justice which
seizes the goods of bankrupts in order to deprive the creditors of
them."
"It was all indispensable," replied the one-eyed doctor, "and
private misfortunes make the public good, so that the more pri-
vate misfortunes there are, the more everything is well."
While he was reasoning, the air grew dark, the winds blew
from the four quarters of the globe and the ship was attacked by
the most horrible tempest in sight of the port of Lisbon.'
I. INTRODUCTION
More than two hundred years after Voltaire's Jacques ex-
pounded on the shortcomings of bankruptcy laws, Congress ad-
dressed his criticism in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782
(Code). The drafters of the 1978 revisions knew that statistics
supported Voltaire's claim. The goods of debtors were being seized
more often to satisfy administrative costs than to satisfy creditors.3
The drafters attempted to resolve the problem by permitting debt-
ors to retain more property. If debtors were allowed to retain more
property, the drafters reasoned, bankruptcy trustees would be less
likely to seize assets of limited value from debtors and liquidate
1. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE OR OPTIMISM 12-13 (N. Torrey ed. 1949).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-151326
(West 1979 & Supp. 1985)). The Bankruptcy Code was the first major bankruptcy law revi-
sion since the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978), which, in turn, had
revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). Until the recently
enacted Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)), Congress had revised the bank-
ruptcy system significantly only once every forty years.
3. A Brookings Institution study reported that creditors received no distribution in ap-
proximately 84% of all straight bankruptcy proceedings, and that in nominal asset cases,
the debtor's property was sold primarily to pay administrative expenses. D. STANLEY & M.
GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 87-88, 175-76 (1971); see also COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT, HR. Doc. No. 137, PART I,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1973) (discussing the problem of administrative expenses in nomi-
nal asset cases) [hereinafter cited as REPORT, PART I].
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them primarily to pay administrative expenses. Congress incorpo-
rated this reform into the Bankruptcy Code in the form of ex-
panded exemption provisions.
Although the Bankruptcy Code resulted from nearly a decade of
study and drafting,4 critics were quick to advocate major revisions.
The consumer credit industry responded by attacking the federal
exemption scheme at the state level. The industry lobbied state
legislatures to "opt out" of the federal scheme under the authority
of Code section 522(b). 5 The industry's efforts have been success-
ful. Approximately thirty-five states have opted out of the federal
scheme,6 and they generally have placed tighter restrictions on the
amount of property a debtor may claim as exempt from creditors'
claims.
The liberal exemptions of the Code were not the only provisions
which the consumer credit industry found unacceptable. The in-
dustry also complained that bankruptcy deprived them of their
ability to collect claims from a debtor's future income.7 Industry
spokesmen noted that a debtor's anticipated future income was the
primary consideration in making consumer loans.' The industry
particularly was troubled by a debtor's ability to avoid liens on ex-
empt property that otherwise secured their debts9 and by the
4. In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes to the [Bankruptcy] Act." Act
of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 468, 468. The Brookings Institution
studied the bankruptcy system before the Commission was created, but did not issue its
report and recommendations until 1971. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 3.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982); see also In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1133-36 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1983) ("opt out" provision does not violate constitutional
requirement of uniform bankruptcy laws).
6. For a compilation of states which have opted out of the federal exemption system, see
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) 1 n.6 (15th ed. 1985).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1981) (testimony of
Jonathan M. Landers, then Professor of Law, U. of Ill. College of Law and consultant to the
consumer credit industry) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Part 1].
8. Id.; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 198-99 (1981) (testimony
of Mr. Donald Beall, representing the Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n and National Ass'n of Fed.
Credit Unions).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1982). But see In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281, 282-84 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1711 (1984) (holding that Tennessee statute permitted exemption
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proliferation of zero payment Chapter 13 plans.10 These concerns
prompted the industry to mount a major lobbying effort seeking
substantive changes to consumer bankruptcy laws.11 Congress
adopted many of the credit industry's proposed reforms in 1984
when it passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 198412 (Bankruptcy Amendments Act).
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act contains three titles. This Ar-
ticle focuses on Title III, which contains the amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code,13 and reviews and critiques these provisions as
they relate to consumer bankruptcy and debtor-creditor relations
in general. This analysis reveals that creditors enjoy significantly
greater protection now than they did before the 1984 amendments.
The Article concludes, however, that although the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act may satisfy previous critics of the Code, many of
the credit industry's criticisms were not well-founded, and in many
instances the Congressional efforts were misdirected.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE AND ELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF
A. The Filing
The substantive changes in consumer bankruptcy embodied in
the Bankruptcy Amendments Act will affect bankruptcy cases even
before actual proceedings are initiated. Among the 1984 amend-
ments is an addition to Code section 342, which now requires the
bankruptcy clerk, "[p]rior to the commencement of [the] case," to
"give written notice to [individual consumer debtors] that indi-
cates each chapter of [the Code] under which such [an] individual
only of the debtor's "equity interest" in property and that debtor could not employ Bank-
ruptcy Code § 522(f)(2) to avoid Hen).
10. One industry spokesman stated that "in our view, [one of] the two most significant
amendments would be... the one that suggests that future income ought to be used to pay
debts to the extent that the debtors reasonably can pay those debts." Hearings, Part I,
supra note 7, at 50 (testimony of Professor Landers); see id. at 65 (statement of Claude
Rice, Alvin 0. Wiese, and Jonathan M. Landers); see also Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good
Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANm L.J. 271, 272 n.6
(1981) (noting the proliferation of zero payment Chapter 13 plans).
11. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 & n.20 [hereinafter cited as
Limiting Access].
12. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)).
13. Id. §§ 301-553, 98 Stat. at 352-92.
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may proceed.' 1 4 The amendment does not indicate how the clerk
should convey this information. Presumably, the clerk's office will
provide some form of notice to all persons filing for bankruptcy
relief indicating the chapters of the Code under which the debtor
may proceed. Before the debtor actually files the petition, the clerk
could provide a copy of the notice and, perhaps, require the debtor
to acknowledge receipt of the notice in writing.
A number of problems complicate this attempt to provide con-
sumer debtors with better information concerning their bank-
ruptcy options. First, debtors rarely file their own petitions. The
debtor's attorney or an employee of the attorney usually files the
bankruptcy petition. The petition even may be filed by mail.'5 In
these situations, the clerk could not provide the debtor with requi-
site notice prior to the commencement of the case. When the
debtor's attorney or the attorney's agent personally files the peti-
tion, the problem could be solved by requiring the individual phys-
ically filing the petition to sign a statement indicating that the
debtor has received written notice of his bankruptcy options. This
procedure, however, would not solve the notice problem for a peti-
tion filed by mail. A workable solution would be to require every
consumer bankruptcy petition to contain a statement, signed by
the debtor, acknowledging that the debtor has received a written
notice which outlined the available bankruptcy options in a man-
ner approved by the bankruptcy court. Other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act already require debtors and their at-
torneys to make similar declarations.' 6
Congress also altered bankruptcy filing procedures by amending
the Official Bankruptcy Forms. Official Bankruptcy Form No. 1
represents the basic voluntary bankruptcy petition. 17 In the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments Act, Congress amended this form by requiring
14. 11 U.S.C.A. § 342(b) (West Supp. 1985).
15. Filing a bankruptcy petition through the mail rather than delivering it personally to
the clerk, however, may create significant problems for the debtor. See In re Butchman, 13
Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (debtor's attorney mailed petition before foreclo-
sure, but clerk received the petition two hours after the foreclosure was completed).
16. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 322, 98 Stat. 333, 357-58 (codified at Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984))
(amending Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C. (1982)); infra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text.
17. Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
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two additional statements. First, petitioners with primarily con-
sumer debts must sign a statement that they are aware of their
option to proceed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the
Code, but that they have chosen to proceed under Chapter 7.18
Second, if the petitioner is represented by an attorney, the attor-
ney must sign a declaration indicating that the attorney has in-
formed the debtor of the availability of either Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 13 relief and has explained the extent of relief available under
each chapter.' 9
These changes in the Official Forms are related closely to the
new notice requirement imposed on the bankruptcy clerk. In fact,
these attempts to ensure that consumer debtors become aware of
their bankruptcy alternatives overlap to a large extent and are un-
necessarily redundant. The notice required of the clerk undoubt-
edly will include some statement highlighting the debtor's choice
of either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 relief. This statement will con-
tain the same information as provided by the debtor's attorney in
the required counseling session, but it will be far less effective in
conveying that information to the debtor.
Interestingly, the debtor's attorney need not inform the debtor
of the possibility of Chapter 11 relief, although the clerk appar-
ently must. Amended Code section 342(b) apparently requires the
clerk to inform debtors of the Chapter 11 option because it directs
the clerk to indicate to consumer debtors each chapter of the Code
under which they may proceed. Consumer debtors eligible for
Chapter 7 relief also are eligible, by definition, for Chapter 11 re-
lief.20 Generally, a consumer debtor will have no reason to opt for
Chapter 11 relief. In some instances, however, Chapter 11 may be
more clearly applicable than Chapter 13 to a particular debtor's
situation, making it easier for the clerk to explain the Chapter 11
option than it would be to explain Chapter 13. For example, if the
debtor owes more than $100,000 in unsecured debts, the determi-
nation of eligibility for Chapter 13 relief may be extremely difficult
because contingent or unliquidated debts are excluded from the
18. Id. 16.
19. Id. %7 & exhibit "B".
20. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(d) (West Supp. 1985).
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$100,000 limitation.2 In such a situation, the new section 342(b)
theoretically requires the clerk to exercise some legal judgment in
determining whether to inform the debtor that Chapter 13 relief is
available. The clerk clearly is not in a position to counsel debtors
in this manner. Counseling in these matters is a fundamental obli-
gation of the debtor's attorney.
Congress adopted the above-mentioned changes to encourage
debtors to choose Chapter 13 proceedings. Congress may not have
been completely successful. Although the amendments should in-
crease debtor awareness of the alternatives, this increased aware-
ness will not result necessarily in more Chapter 13 filings or fewer
Chapter 7 filings. Reasons other than debtor ignorance may
discourage Chapter 13 filings.22 To the extent that the use of Chap-
ter 13 by consumer debtors is restricted by debtor ignorance, how-
ever, the proportion of Chapter 13 filings should increase.23
B. Preliminary Discretion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Filings
If a consumer debtor decides to file for Chapter 7 relief after
being informed fully of other alternatives, the petition remains
subject to dismissal. The Bankruptcy Amendments Act added sec-
tion 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code, providing the bankruptcy
courts with discretion to dismiss a Chapter 7 case if the court
"finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of
the provisions of [Chapter 7].''24 The amendment does not indicate
what constitutes a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7. Statements
from both the House of Representatives and the Senate, however,
suggest that "substantial abuse" occurs when a debtor would have
21. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982). See generally Drake & Morris, Eligibility for Relief Under
Chapter 13, 57 Am. BANKFa L. REV. 195, 196-205 (1983).
22. The Bankruptcy Commission noted, for example, that malevolent attitudes of attor-
neys and bankruptcy judges toward Chapter 13 may explain the limited use of that form of
relief. REPORT, PART I, supra note 3, at 157-58.
23. Other factors also affect the number of bankruptcy filings. For example, several wit-
nesses who testified before the Senate suggested that the increase in bankruptcy filings after
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was attributable in part to attorney advertising which
informed debtors of their rights and options under the bankruptcy laws. See, e.g., Hearings,
Part I, supra note 7, at 42 (testimony of Professor Landers); id. at 298-300 (testimony of
Richard Levin, an attorney in private practice who specializes in commercial bankruptcy
reorganizations).
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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significant future income which would be protected from debts dis-
charged in a Chapter 7 proceeding, but which could be used to re-
pay some or all of these debts if a Chapter 13 plan were filed.25
The court may consider the issue of substantial abuse only on its
own motion. Section 707(b) specifically prohibits interested parties
from suggesting to the court that dismissal for substantial abuse of
Chapter 7 provisions would be appropriate.26 This restriction raises
a practical problem of implementation because it does not explain
how the bankruptcy court can become aware that a particular
Chapter 7 petition constitutes a "substantial abuse" of the Code. If
the focus is solely on the debtor's postpetition ability to generate
funds sufficient to repay prepetition indebtedness in whole or in
part, the court would be required to determine each Chapter 7
debtor's future financial status. Substantial clairvoyance is neces-
sary to make such determinations, but the task is made easier be-
cause the Bankruptcy Amendments Act imposed an additional
duty on debtors. Under Code section 521(1), Chapter 7 debtors
must file a "schedule of current income and current expendi-
tures. '2 7 From this schedule, the court can extrapolate the debtor's
financial status over a three year period to determine whether the
25. 130 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 130 CONG.
REc. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
One court has addressed the operation of Section 707(b) on two occasions. The Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina has held that allowing a debtor to
proceed under Chapter 7 when he had the ability to repay a significant portion of his obliga-
tions out of future income under a Chapter 13 plan would be a substantial abuse of the
provisions of Chapter 7. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). The same
court has stated in dicta that allowing a debtor with limited future income to obtain Chap-
ter 7 discharge of a sizeable tort judgment would not be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7. In
re White, 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). The court in White held that Section
707(b) did not apply because the only claim against the petitioner, a tort judgment which
arose out of an automobile accident, was not a consumer debt. The petitioner had not in-
curred the debt primarily for a personal, family or household purpose. Id. at 872-73.
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1985). Section 707(b) provides that the court may
dismiss a Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse only "on its own motion and not at the
request or suggestion of any party in interest." A creditor, however, could seek an order of
abstention under section 305(a) of the Code to bring the debtor's financial status to the
court's attention. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1982). The court then could decide on its own motion
to dismiss the case under section 707(b).
27. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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debtor's anticipated income, less expenses, will be sufficient to re-
pay a significant portion of the debtor's dischargeable debts.' 8 If
sufficient income is anticipated, a complete discharge of the
debtor's obligations would constitute a substantial abuse of Chap-
ter 7.
The wisdom of extrapolating current earnings and expenses over
a future period is questionable.2 9 A major study of consumer debt-
ors funded by the consumer credit industry suggested that this
method of projecting future income is appropriate,30 but the criti-
cisms of this study are more persuasive.3 1 Whichever side is cor-
rect, the bankruptcy courts must continue to rely on this data be-
cause they have no other way to determine independently whether
a particular Chapter 7 petition should be dismissed as a "substan-
tial abuse."
C. Limitation of the Debtor's Ability to Initiate Bankruptcy
Proceedings
One other amendment to the Code will affect consumer debtors'
ability to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The Bankruptcy
Amendments Act added a new subsection (f) to Code section 109.
Section 109(f) prohibits a bankruptcy filing by any individual who
was
a debtor in a case pending under [the Bankruptcy Code] at any
time in the preceding 180 days if: (1) the case was dismissed by
the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide by orders of
28. The extrapolation must be for three years to reflect the new provision in Chapter 13
that requires debtors to apply all of their disposable income for three years to their Chapter
13 plans unless they pay all unsecured claims in full. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b) (West Supp.
1985). See infra notes 296-347 and accompanying text.
29. For an excellent discussion of the problems inherent in making predictions of future
income, see Limiting Access, supra note 11, at 1117-29.
30. Credit Research Center, Krannert School of Management, Purdue U., Monograph
Nos. 23-24 (1982). This study frequently is described either as the "Johnson Study" after its
director, Dr. Robert Johnson, or as the "Purdue Study."
31. See, e.g., Limiting Access, supra note 11, at 1117-29; Ginsberg, The Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Improvements Act: The Creditors Strike Back, 1982 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 1, 18 n.75;
Shuchman & Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings and Other Pur-
poses, 56 AM. BANKR L.J. 1, 11 n.27 (1982); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM ACT OF 1978-A BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK (1983).
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the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of
the case; or (2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary
dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for relief
from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of [the Bank-
ruptcy Code].32
The rationale underlying section 109(f) is that debtors should
not be permitted to disrupt the court's processing of bankruptcy
cases. Debtors covered by section 109(f)(1) have had their chance
for bankruptcy relief, and have wasted it. This new subsection rep-
resents an appropriate legislative response to isolated instances of
debtor misconduct. 33
Section 109(f)(2) addresses a somewhat different problem. In
many cases, Chapter 13 debtors have initiated bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to thwart creditors' efforts to foreclose on their resi-
dences.3 4 In response, creditors often have sought immediate relief
from the automatic stay so they could continue foreclosure pro-
ceedings. If the bankruptcy court granted relief to a particular
creditor, the debtor would voluntarily dismiss the Chapter 13 pro-
ceedings,35 causing the automatic stay to terminate pursuant to
section 362(c).3 ' If the creditor subsequently reinstated foreclosure
proceedings, the debtor would refile under Chapter 13 to prevent
the second attempted foreclosure. Before the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments Act, courts responded to these actions either by employing
res judicata principles to lift the stay in the second bankruptcy
case, 3 or by dismissing the first bankruptcy case with prejudice to
32. 11 U.S.C.A. §109(f) (West Supp. 1985).
33. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 35 Bankr. 596, 602-03 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dis-
missing Chapter 13 case because debtor refused to cooperate in the section 341 meeting of
creditors, failed to file schedules as required, and generally obstructed the bankruptcy
process).
34. See, e.g., In re Damien, 35 Bankr. 685 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Sando, 30 Bankr.
474 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
35. 35 Bankr. at 687; 30 Bankr. at 475.
36. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) provides that the automatic stay of
acts against property of the estate terminates when the "property is no longer property of
the estate," while the stay of all other acts terminates when the case is "closed" or
"dismissed."
37. E.g., In re Bystrek, 17 Bankr. 894, 896 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982). But see In re Bumpass,
28 Bankr. 597, 599 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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any new bankruptcy filing for a stated period of time.38 Congress
adopted the latter approach when it added section 109(f)(2) to the
Code.39
Section 109(f) may be an excessive restriction on debtor ability
to refile bankruptcy cases. The statute provides no discretion for
the bankruptcy courts to permit refiling in appropriate circum-
stances. For example, a debtor who initiates a Chapter 13 proceed-
ing and subsequently becomes unemployed now may be unable to
make the payments called for by the Chapter 13 plan, and will
want to dismiss the proceeding voluntarily. If a creditor already
has filed for relief from the automatic stay to continue repossession
of the debtor's second car, for example, section 109(f)(2) appar-
ently would disqualify the debtor from further bankruptcy relief
for 180 days after dismissal of the Chapter 13 proceedings. This
disqualification still applies if the debtor subsequently becomes
employed-even at a higher rate of pay. It also will prevent the
debtor from refiling for bankruptcy even after the creditor com-
pletes repossession and takes possession of the collateral. The new
statute addresses and resolves a problem which deserves attention,
but its provisions are too broad and may prevent some honest but
unfortunate debtors from obtaining the relief they need. The rela-
tively short time restriction on refiling, however, should minimize
the number of cases in which the statute operates unfairly.
If the strict operation of section 109(f) would cause undue hard-
ship in a particular instance, a court might consider permitting the
debtor to reopen the original bankruptcy case. The Code permits a
court to reopen a case to "administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause. '40 In cases of undue hardship, a court
might justify reopening the original case either to accord relief to
the debtor or to benefit other creditors who might fare better in a
Chapter 13 proceeding than otherwise. This proposed end run
around new section 109(f)(2) may not be available, however, be-
cause the language of section 109(f) prohibits an individual from
38. In re Damien, 35 Bankr. 685, 687 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (court dismissed case with
prejudice to the commencement of another bankruptcy proceeding for one year).
39. The amended dismissal provision of the Code also adopts this approach. 11 U.S.C.A. §
349(a) (West Supp. 1985).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (1982); see Bankr. Rule 5010, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
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being a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, rather than from com-
mencing a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. Interpreted liter-
ally, the new provision would not permit the court to reopen an
earlier case to bypass the mandated 180 day limitation.
The courts, however, may interpret section 109(f)(2) to retain
some discretion to permit subsequent filings in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Section 109(f)(2) prohibits debtors from obtaining fur-
ther bankruptcy relief for 180 days if they dismissed a prior case
"following" a request for relief from the stay. The courts could
construe "following" not in a chronological sense, but rather as
meaning "in response to" or "because of." Using this interpreta-
tion, the bankruptcy court could permit a subsequent filing if the
debtor did not seek the first dismissal to avoid a creditor's foreclo-
sure after a request for relief from the automatic stay. This inter-
pretation would permit bankruptcy courts to release debtors ap-
parently caught in the net of section 109(f)(2). 4'
III. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
When an individual initiates a bankruptcy proceeding and the
individual has assets subject to security interests arising from con-
sumer transactions, the individual must "file with the clerk a state-
ment of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of
such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is
claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such prop-
erty, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such
property. '4 2 The debtor must file this statement "within 30 days
after the date of the filing of a [Chapter 7] petition . . or on or
before the date of the meeting of the creditors, whichever is ear-
lier. '4 3 If the debtor is unable to file the statement within thirty
41. Two courts have construed section 109(f)(2). In In re Patton, 49 Bankr. 587 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1985), the court held that Section 109(f)(2) prevented a debtor from reinstituting
bankruptcy proceedings during the statutory period only if the initial dismissal was in re-
sponse to a creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay. The court in In re Keziah,
46 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985), however, held that it had no discretion to permit the
second bankruptcy case, and it refused to consider the debtor's alleged unrelated reasons for
voluntary dismissal of the first case. The court's analysis in Patton probably is appropriate
and preferable to Keziah because it more correctly reflects the intent of Congress.
42. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
43. Id.
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days, the court may grant additional time if the debtor requests it
before the original period expires.4" After the debtor files this no-
tice of intent, he has forty-five days to "perform his intention with
respect to such property. ' 45 Once again, the court may extend the
period if the debtor requests it before the forty-five day period
expires.46
Before the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, secured creditors had
encountered delays in obtaining possession of collateral or arriving
at other agreements concerning collateral securing consumer
debts.47 The above-mentioned changes wrought by the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act should accelerate the process considerably. Debt-
ors often are concerned primarily with whether the court will per-
mit them to retain possession of certain personal property. Previ-
ously, a debtor could continue to possess property for a substantial
time without paying for it by holding it until the court ruled on a
creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay. The new time
limits in section 521(2) will force debtors and their attorneys to
seek prompt decisions concerning the disposition of secured prop-
erty. The restrictions will force debtors with no right to retain cer-
tain collateral to surrender the collateral to secured creditors
within seventy-five days after filing a bankruptcy petition unless
the court specifically grants an extension. Debtors and their attor-
neys should be able to consider the options and act upon them
within seventy-five days. If the debtor needs more time in a partic-
ular case, the court may grant an extension to meet emergency
needs. This amendment represents a positive step in the efficient
processing of secured claims. Besides benefiting secured creditors
by resolving their status earlier, it also should benefit debtors by
promoting quicker settlement of their affairs.
Congress provided secured creditors with an additional safe-
guard by amending Code section 704. The amended section re-
quires a Chapter 7 trustee to "ensure that the debtor shall perform
44. Id.
45. Id. § 521(2)(B).
46. Id.
47. See Ulrich, Comments on the Consumer Finance Industry's Proposals to Improve
the Position of Secured Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
381, 392-93 (1982).
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his intention as specified in section 521(2)(B). 48 Chapter 13 trust-
ees have the same obligation.49 Perhaps recognizing the potential
burden this new section imposes on trustees, Congress also in-
creased trustee compensation.50 Trustees who ensure delivery of
collateral to secured creditors, however, likely will argue that under
section 506(c) they also are entitled to recover from the secured
property "the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserv-
ing, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to
the holder of [the secured] claim."51 In light of this provision, cred-
itors who believe they can recover collateral with less expense than
the trustee should maximize their recovery by collecting the prop-
erty without the trustee's assistance. Unfortunately, any action
taken by the trustee to effect the return of the collateral may auto-
matically entitle the trustee to compensation under section 506(c),
thus reducing the creditor's recovery.
IV. REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS
One of the options available to debtors for disposing of collateral
is to reaffirm some or all of the underlying obligation owing to the
secured creditor and to retain possession of the collateral. To exer-
cise this option, a debtor must notify creditors of the intention to
reaffirm shortly after the commencement of the case52 and must
make the reaffirmation within forty-five days after the notification
to creditors.53 As a result, the debtor and the debtor's attorney
must engage in reaffirmation planning at the outset of the consid-
eration of bankruptcy options.
Before the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the
debtor's attorney played only an advisory role in reaffirmation
matters. The debtor and creditors ultimately determined whether
to reaffirm prebankruptcy obligations. The Bankruptcy Code, how-
ever, injected the bankruptcy judge into the process. Section 524(c)
48. 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(3) (West Supp. 1985).
49. Id. § 1302(b)(1).
50. Id. §§ 326(a)-(b), 330(b)-(c).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982); see, e.g., In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir.
1982); In re AFCO Enters., Inc., 35 Bankr. 512, 514-15 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text.
53. Id. § 521(2)(B); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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provided that reaffirmations of dischargeable consumer debts were
unenforceable unless the court approved the agreement as not im-
posing an undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents and as
being in the debtor's best interest.4 As a result, courts denied en-
forcement of many agreements reached by debtors and creditors.
55
The consumer credit industry argued that this practice was pater-
nalistic and otherwise inappropriate,56 and proposed that debtors
and creditors be permitted to negotiate reaffirmation agreements
without court oversight but with an expanded period for debtors to
rescind agreements.57
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act includes a significant change
from both the Bankruptcy Code and the credit industry proposal
for treatment of reaffirmation agreements. Section 524(c) now pro-
vides that reaffirmations of consumer debts are enforceable with-
out court approval if the debtor's attorney, in essence, approves
the agreement.58 If no attorney represented the debtor in negotia-
tions with the creditor, the court's approval will remain a prerequi-
site to enforcement of the agreement.5 9 In most cases, however, the
debtor's attorney will have participated in the negotiations and
therefore will have to issue, or decline to issue, the approval. Ei-
ther way, the process will remain "paternalistic," although usually
the debtor's attorney rather than the court will exercise the
paternalism.
Presumably, Congress expected to increase the number of reaf-
firmation agreements by removing bankruptcy court approval as a
condition of enforceability.60 Whether debtors' attorneys generally
54. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Supp. 1985).
55. E.g., In re Bryant, 43 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Long, 3 Bankr. 656
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
56. Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 90-91 (Recommending Note accompanying Pro-
posed Consumer Bankruptcy Improvements Act).
57. Id. The credit industry suggested that a sixty-day recission period was sufficient to
protect debtors.
58. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
59. Id. § 524(c)(6).
60. See 130 CONG. REc. S8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 590, 598 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Another provision [of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments Act] simplifies the debt reaffirmation agreement procedures to en-
courage debtors to make mutually satisfactory arrangements to repay debts outside of
bankruptcy.").
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will offer their approval of these agreements, however, is question-
able. The new reaffirmation agreement approval process also has
the disadvantage of thrusting the debtor's attorney into an inap-
propriate position. The attorney should counsel and advise the
debtor concerning a proposed reaffirmation agreement, but the at-
torney should not have the power to decide for the debtor whether
a particular reaffirmation is inappropriate. The new provision
forces attorneys into that position, however, because a reaffirma-
tion agreement is unenforceable until the debtor's attorney ap-
proves it.61 Consequently, whether the number of reaffirmations in-
creases or decreases rests to a large extent on the judgment of
debtors' attorneys, a result probably not anticipated by Congress
and certainly not requested by the interests that sought a change
in the Code's reaffirmation provisions.
V. EXEMPTIONS
Congress also amended the exemption provisions contained in
section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code. These exemptions are of
somewhat limited significance because most states have opted out
of the federal exemption scheme.62 In these states, the amend-
ments will have no effect on consumer bankruptcy cases. In the
remaining states, however, the three changes to the exemption pro-
visions outlined below will apply.
A. "Spillover" of the Unused Portion of the Residence Exemption
The federal bankruptcy exemptions are listed in Code section
522(d).6 Prior to the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, a debtor was
able to claim an exemption for any interest in a residence up to a
value of $7500.64 The debtor also was able to claim an exemption
for an interest in any property up to a value of $400 plus the un-
used portion of the $7500 residence exemption. 5 This provision
enabled the debtor to "spill over" the unused portion of the resi-
dence exemption into the $400 general exemption.
61. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c)(3) (West. Supp. 1985).
62. See supra note 6.
63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1982).
65. Id. § 522(d)(5), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
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In the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, Congress placed a $3750
limit on the amount of the unused portion of the residence exemp-
tion that can "spill over" into the general exemption. This
amendment represents a slight reversal in policy, because it favors
homeowners over renters. For example, a homeowner who has a
$4000 interest in a residence67 may claim the interest as exempt,
and may claim an additional $3900 exemption through the "spill-
over" provision of section 522(d)(5),65 for a total of $7900 in ex-
empt property. If the same debtor rented an apartment, however,
the debtor could claim only a total of $4150.69 Although the restric-
tion on "spillover" represents a limitation on renters' exemption
rights, it was a logical step because renters presumably have ade-
quate exemptions without need for the protection of an equity in-
terest in a residence. The categories of exempt property listed in
section 522(d) should be sufficient to permit a "fresh start" for any
debtor.70
B. The Household Goods Exemption
The second change made by the Bankruptcy Amendments Act
to section 522(d) also limits debtors' ability to exempt certain
property. Section 522(d)(3) originally exempted the debtor's inter-
est "in any particular item, in household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances [and certain other goods] . ..
held primarily for ...personal, family, or household use."'71 The
original statute limited the value of the exemption for each indi-
vidual item to $200, but it placed no cap on the aggregate amount
66. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
67. The value of a debtor's interest in property subject to a lien or liens is the excess of
the fair market value of the asset over the amount of the liens on the property. See, e.g., In
re Henderson, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 101 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983).
68. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985). The $3900 exemption would come from
the $3500 which "spills over" from the residence exemption of section 522(d)(1) after the
$4000 interest in the residence is deducted, plus the $400 general exemption.
69. Id. The $4150 exemption would come from the $3750 maximum which "spills over"
from the unused portion of the residence exemption of section 522(d)(1), plus the $400 gen-
eral exemption.
70. See Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative Ap-
proach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129 (1983). But see Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for
Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333 (1984).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 27:91
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REFORM
a debtor could claim under section 522(d)(3). 72 Consequently, al-
though the provision was intended to permit debtors to keep
household goods and furnishings of limited value to avoid large
replacement costs, section 522(d)(3) also permitted debtors to en-
gage in exemption planning before filing a bankruptcy petition. 3
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act placed a $4000 aggregate value
limit on property that the debtor may exempt under section
522(d)(3). This amendment does not, of course, prevent debtors
from engaging in prebankruptcy planning. It does, however, limit
the benefit of that planning to $4000. Given the purpose underly-
ing section 522(d)(3), this limitation seems appropriate. 4
C. The Choice of Federal or State Exemptions in Joint
Bankruptcies
The final change which Congress made to the exemption provi-
sions in 1984 probably was the most significant. Code section
522(m) originally allowed bankruptcy exemptions to apply sepa-
rately to each debtor in a joint bankruptcy case.7 5 In joint bank-
ruptcies, each spouse could claim totally separate exemptions. 6 In
states which had opted out of the federal exemption system, each
debtor could choose the applicable state exemption and claim the
72. See, e.g., In re Wahl, 14 Bankr. 153, 154-56 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (each knife, fork,
and spoon in a set of sterling silverware is a separate item for purposes of the exemption
available under § 522(d)(3)).
73. See generally Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Non-
exempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 615 (1978).
74. The exemption statute proposed in the Bankruptcy Commission's report served as a
guide for subsequent congressional proposals. The Commission's exemption provision, sec-
tion 4-503(c)(1), proposed a limit of $1,000 on the amount of household furnishings and
related items that a debtor could claim as exempt to avoid abuse of this exemption. See
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT, HR. Doc. No.
137, PART II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT, PART I].
A recent nonbankruptcy federal action will affect debtors' exemption claims significantly.
The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a new rule that prohibits creditors from
taking non-purchase money security interests in certain household goods. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 444.1-.5 (1985). Although the definition of household goods in the rule is somewhat lim-
ited, the rule should operate in conjunction with the exemption provisions of the Code and
state law to expand protection for debtors.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(m) (West Supp. 1985).
76. See, e.g., Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1981).
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amount available under the applicable state law.7 In states which
had not opted out, the debtors had an even wider variety of
choices. They could both choose the state exemptions, both choose
the federal exemptions, or one spouse could choose the state ex-
emptions while the other chose the federal exemptions. The last
situation posed the greatest problem.
7 s
Several states that had not "opted out" of the federal exemption
system provided for more extensive exemptions than the federal
system allowed .7 These state statutes, however, frequently limited
the exemptions to heads of households, and did not allow separate
election by each spouse.80 In this situation, the head of household
could choose the state exemptions while the other spouse chose the
federal exemptions, thus providing the joint debtors with more
favorable treatment than if they both had chosen either the state
or the federal exemption scheme. For example, California formerly
allowed heads of households to exempt any property up to $45,000
in aggregate value.81 Under the old statute, if the head of house-
hold chose the California exemptions while the other spouse
claimed the federal exemptions, the joint debtors could exempt
77. See Cannady v. Wilson, 653 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. For example, a debtor in Texas who is a head of household formerly could claim
up to $30,000 in personal property as exempt from attachment. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (repealed 1984). If that debtor initiated a joint bankruptcy
proceeding along with the debtor's spouse, the debtor/spouse could exempt additional per-
sona property pursuant to section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Arguably, the state ex-
emption already protected the debtor's spouse, but under section 522(m) each debtor could
make a separate claim of exempt property. The bankruptcy court in Cannady unsuccess-
fully attempted to prevent this perceived "double-dip" of exemptions. See 653 F.2d at 213-
14 (reversing bankruptcy court holding concerning the exemption issue).
79. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.38.010, .065 (1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 651-91 to -92 (1976
& Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.01-.02, 550.371(2) (West 1947 & Supp. 1985); Tax.
Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (repealed 1984).
80. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010(b) (1983) (individual homestead exemption of not more
than $27,000 also available to co-owners of property, but aggregate value not to exceed
$27,000).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260(a)(1) (West 1982) (repealed 1983). Current California law sets
an exemption which varies from $30,000 to $55,000 depending upon the ownership interest
of the debtor's spouse in the homestead and the age and physical condition of the debtor.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.730 (West Supp. 1985).
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$52,900 equity in a residence 2 along with the other varieties of ex-
empt property set out in section 522(d).83 This method of choosing
exemptions seemingly allowed debtors to claim more exemptions
than were intended by either Congress or the state legislatures.8s
Section 522(m) of the original Code, however, clearly provided that
the exemption provisions applied separately to each joint debtor.
The courts interpreted that provision literally and upheld the sep-
arate exemption claims of each spouse.8 5
Because this "mix or match" method of exemption planning ex-
panded the exemptions debtors could claim beyond the intended
amount, Congress eliminated that choice for joint debtors in the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act. Debtors may continue to choose ei-
ther the state or the federal exemption, but they both must choose
the same statutory scheme.86 If the joint debtors cannot agree on
which exemption scheme to choose, section 522(b) provides that
the federal exemptions will apply.8 7
One loophole remains with respect to spouses attempting to
choose separate exemption schemes. The new statute applies to
debtors who file joint petitions under section 302 and to individual
82. The $52,900 exemption would come from the aggregate of the $45,000 value claimed
by the head of household under the California statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260(a)(1) (West
1982) (repealed 1983), the $7500 residence exemption claimed by the other spouse under the
federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West
Supp. 1985), and the $400 exemption for any property claimed by the other spouse under
the federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West
Supp. 1985). Since July 1, 1983, California has prohibited joint debtors from choosing the
federal exemptions. Through this action, the California legislature has precluded the combi-
nation of the state homestead exemption and the federal exemptions available under section
522(d) of the Code. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 704.730 (West Supp. 1985).
83. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(3) (West Supp.
1985) (debtor may claim as exempt up to $200 in value in any particular item of household
goods or furnishings).
84. For example, the Alaska homestead exemption protects a maximum of $27,000 equity
in a residence whether the property is individually or jointly owned. See supra note 80.
Permitting joint debtors to add another $7900 to the state exemption probably would con-
travene the Alaska legislature's intention to limit the total household exemption to $27,000.
85. See, e.g., Cannady v. Wilson, 653 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981); Ageton v. Cervenka, 14
Bankr. 833 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981); In re Jones, 31 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
86. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(m) (West Supp. 1985). This new section provides that the exemp-
tion provisions apply separately to each debtor, subject to the limitation on the splitting of
exemption claims between those allowed under state law and those set out in section 522(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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debtors when the court orders their bankruptcy proceedings to be
administered jointly.8 The statute does not apply, however, to a
spouse who initiates an individual bankruptcy proceeding when
joint administration of the estates is not appropriate 9 or when the
court already has concluded the other spouse's bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. For example, if the head of household initiated a bank-
ruptcy proceeding and claimed an available state exemption, the
court could process and close the case without considering the
other spouse. After the court closed the case, the other spouse
could initiate a bankruptcy proceeding and claim exemptions
under section 522(d). In effect, the spouses would be claiming the
same expanded exemptions that they could have claimed in a joint
case before the Bankruptcy Amendments Act.
Several methods are available, however, to prevent spouses from
circumventing the new restriction on the choice of exemptions.
First, the court could find that Congress intended to prevent sepa-
rate exemption choices by spouses in all instances, and could pro-
hibit different exemption choices whenever both spouses file bank-
ruptcy petitions. This approach would disregard the explicit
language of the statute in favor of effectuating congressional in-
tent. A "do as I mean, not as I say" approach is not without prece-
dent in recent bankruptcy case law,90 but the court might not want
to take such a position if an alternative were available.
88. Id.
89. Bankruptcy Rule 1015 provides that the bankruptcy court "may order a joint admin-
istration of the estates [of a husband and wife]." Bankr. Rule 1015(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West
1984). The rule is discretionary, not mandatory. When a court exercises this discretion, the
rule requires it to "give consideration to protecting creditors of different estates against
potential conflicts of interest." Id. In most joint bankruptcy cases, joint administration is
appropriate. See In re Coles, 14 Bankr. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
90. The treatment of the dischargeability of educational loans provides an interesting ex-
ample. Congress amended the Higher Education Act in 1977 to provide that educational
loans were not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless the obligation imposed an undue hard-
ship on the debtor or his dependents or the discharge was granted more than five years after
the date on which payments first were due on the loan. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed
1978). Congress repealed that statute in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 317, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678. Congress replaced the repealed statute with a similar
provision, id. § 101, ch. 5, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. at 2591 (to have been codified at 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)) (amended 1979 prior to codification), but overlooked the fact that the new provi-
sion did not become effective until October 1, 1979. Id. § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 2682; see S. REP.
No. 230, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 936, 937.
The new provision also inadvertently did not cover all of the student loan programs covered
[Vol. 27:91112
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Fortunately, an alternative position is available. In appropriate
circumstances, creditors could initiate an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding against the nonfiling spouse.9 1 If an order for relief
were entered,92 parties in interest could seek to have the bank-
ruptcy proceedings jointly administered, thereby invoking the new
restriction on available exemption choices. If the court had closed
the first spouse's bankruptcy proceedings before the second spouse
filed, creditors or the trustee still could pursue this alternative by
asking the court to reopen the first bankruptcy proceeding9 3 and to
order joint administration of the two estates.
The bankruptcy court has discretion to order joint administra-
tion of separately filed proceedings when the individual debtors are
entitled by section 302 of the Code to file jointly94 but they fail to
do so. Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides that if "two or more peti-
tions are pending in the same court by or against. . . a husband
and wife, ... the court may order a joint administration of the
by the old one. See id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 936-37. On
August 14, 1979, Congress acted to close these unintentional loopholes. Act of Aug. 14, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982)) (amended 1984).
Despite the drafting error, the courts generally continued to apply the exception as if the
original statute remained in force. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the hiatus between the effective dates "was purely a manifestation
of congressional inadvertence and that to follow blindly the plain meaning of the statute
without regard to the obvious intention of Congress would create an absurd result in accord
with neither established principles of statutory construction nor common sense." Wisconsin
Higher Educ. Aids Bd. v. Lipke, 630 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting In re
Adamo, 619 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980)).
91. Involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are governed by 11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1985). An amendment to section 303 contained in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act
could make involuntary bankruptcy relief much more difficult to obtain. Creditors whose
claims are the "subject of a bona fide dispute" are not eligible to initiate involuntary cases.
11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
92. If the debtor does not controvert an involuntary petition, or if the court finds that the
debtor is not paying his or her debts as they come due or a custodian was appointed within
the preceding 120 days to take charge of less than substantially all of the debtor's property,
the bankruptcy court must enter an order for relief. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1985).
93. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 350(b) (West Supp. 1985); Bankr. Rule 5010, 11 U.S.C.A. (West
1984).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1982). Only married persons may initiate joint bankruptcy cases
under section 302. In re Coles, 14 Bankr. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
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estates." '95 The Rule further requires the court to "give considera-
tion to protecting creditors of different estates against potential
conflicts of interest" in determining whether to order joint admin-
istration of separate proceedings.9 6 Joint administration is very dif-
ferent from consolidation of the estates, in which the debtors' as-
sets and liabilities are combined for all purposes, including
purposes unrelated to administration.9 7 Joint administration pri-
marily involves simply the appointment or election of the same
trustee for both bankruptcy estates. 8 The trustee still must ac-
count separately for property received by and distributed from
each bankruptcy estate.9 Congress authorized joint administration
to reduce administrative costs because it assumed that the spouses'
assets would be located in the same place or reasonably nearby, the
spouses would have many of the same creditors, and the spouses
might have books and records located together.100 To effectuate
this purpose, courts generally will order joint administration of
spouses' estates, and the new limitations on exemption choices al-
most always will apply when bankruptcy cases are pending against
a husband and wife.
VI. PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
A "voidable preference" may occur when, under certain circum-
stances, an insolvent debtor transfers property to a creditor. Any
allegedly preferential transfer will be considered a voidable prefer-
ence under the Bankruptcy Code if it meets the following require-
ments: (1) the transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor,
95. Bankr. Rule 1015(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984); see supra note 89.
95. Id.; see supra note 89.
97. The Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 1015 indicates that consolidation
of estates is appropriate when the assets and liabilities of two or more entities are so inter-
mingled that the court cannot separate them. Joint administration is not as restricted, how-
ever, because it involves only "the joint handling of ... purely administrative matters that
may aid in expediting the cases and rendering the process less costly," and not any substan-
tive consolidation of debtors' assets and liabilities. Bankr. Rule 1015 advisory committee
note, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
98. Bankr. Rule 2009(a), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
99. Id. Rule 2009(f).
100. See Bankr. Rule 1015 advisory committee note, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984); supra note
97; see also Seligson & Mandell, Multi-Debtor Petition-Consolidation of Debtors and Due
Process of Law, 73 CoM. L.J. 341 (1968).
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(2) the transfer must be for or on account of an antecedent debt,
(3) the debtor must have been insolvent at the time of the transfer,
(4) the transfer must have been made within ninety days before
the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition, and (5) the transfer must
have enabled the creditor to collect more than he would have re-
ceived if the transfer had not occurred and the trustee had distrib-
uted debtor's assets under the provisions of Chapter 7.101 The main
purpose of the Code's preference provisions is to promote equality
in the distribution of the debtor's estate to creditors. To accom-
plish this goal, the Code prevents certain creditors from receiving
payments shortly before the debtor initiates bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Without this protection, debtors could deplete the assets that
otherwise would be distributed fairly to all creditors on a pro rata
basis.102 Preferential transfer rules also discourage creditors "from
racing to the court house to dismember the debtor during his slide
into bankruptcy. . . thus afford[ing] the debtor [an opportunity]
to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through coop-
eration with all of his creditors.' 10 3
In the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, Congress adopted several
changes in the preference provisions of the Code which bear on
consumer bankruptcy cases. The Act altered the provisions gov-
erning preferential transfers to insiders,0 4 preferential transfers of
less than $600,105 and debts repaid in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. 106 These changes must be analyzed in light of Congress' over-
all objectives in regulating voidable preferences.
A. Preferential Transfers to Insiders
Allegedly preferential transfers often involve a debtor who pays
an obligation to an "insider" to the detriment of other creditors.
The Code definition of "insiders" includes relatives of the debtor,
101. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See generally 4 COLTIR ON BANK-
RUPTCY (MB) 1i 547.01-.55 (15th ed. 1985).
102. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6138.
103. Id. at 177, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6138.
104. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
105. Id. § 547(c)(7).
106. Id. § 547(c)(2).
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partnerships in which the debtor is a general partner, general part-
ners of the debtor, relatives of general partners of the debtor, and
corporations of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control. 0 7 A relative is defined as an "individual related by affinity
or consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the
common law, or [an] individual in a step or adoptive relationship
within such third degree."'1 8 Under this definition, the debtor's
spouse, parents and children all are insiders for the purposes of the
Code. Debtors often owe money to these insiders, and may have
repaid some of the obligation through the transfer of money, other
property, or a security interest.
The Code's insider preference provisions'0 " were amended in the
"Miscellaneous Amendments" portion of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments Act." 0 Despite their classification as "miscellaneous," these
changes will have a significant effect on some consumer bank-
ruptcy cases. Before the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, transfers to
insiders which occurred between ninety days and one year before
the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition were deemed voidable
only if they met all the other requirements of the preference sec-
tion."' The bankruptcy trustee had the power to avoid these pref-
erential transfers only if the insiders "had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer. 1" 2 If
the transfers occurred within ninety days before the bankruptcy
filing, however, the trustee could avoid the transfers regardless of
whether the insider creditors knew of the debtor's insolvency.1 3
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act removed the requirement that
the insider have "reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insol-
vent" for the entire year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.1 4
Consequently, Congress removed the major difference between the
107. Id. § 101(28).
108. Id. § 101(37).
109. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
110. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 421-534, 98 Stat. 333, 367-90 (1984). The new insider prefer-
ence provisions appeared in section 462 of the Act. Id. § 462(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 378.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (West Supp.
1985).
112. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
113. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 178-79, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6139.
114. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
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treatment of preferential transfers to insiders and the treatment of
preferential transfers to other creditors.
One significant difference between the two types of preferential
transfers still remains. Section 547(f) provides that "the debtor is
presumed to have been insolvent on and during the ninety days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.'n
This presumption does not apply to transfers made more than
ninety days before the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. To
avoid these transfers, the trustee must prove that the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer." 6 Although the new insider
provision retained this distinction, the provision still will have a
significant impact because trustees will find proving that the
debtor was actually insolvent at the time of the transfer will be
much easier than proving that the insider had "reasonable cause to
believe" that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer.""
Considering the nature of insider transactions, the new provision
may not further the goals of voidable preference legislation. Con-
gress originally placed the one year limitation on certain insider
transactions rather than the ninety day limitation applicable to
other preferences because many debtors can refrain from filing a
bankruptcy petition until a short time limitation has passed. Debt-
ors are especially willing to do this when insider transactions are
involved because they often want to repay family debts first.1 8
The "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent"
requirement made sense for insider transactions that took place
between ninety days and one year before bankruptcy because if the
insider was close enough to the debtor to justify the concerns that
prompted the insider preference provision, the insider presumably
115. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982); see, e.g., In re Rustia, 20 Bankr. 131, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982); Mazer v. Aetna Fin. Co. (In re Zuni), 6 Bankr. 449, 451 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980).
116. Day v. Central Fidelity Bank, 6 BANKc CT. DEc. (CRR) 1239, 1240 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1980). Section 547(g) now provides explicitly that the trustee has the burden of proving all
the elements of a voidable preference set out in section 547(b). 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(g) (West
Supp. 1985).
117. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 178-79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 6138-39; Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 Am
BANKm L.J. 173, 183-84 (1979).
118. See, e.g., McCullough v. Camden Nursery, Inc., 31 Bankr. 1, 4 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982);
Ross v. Kaplan (In re Harris), 7 Bankr. 456, 457-58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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would have gained sufficient knowledge from which a reasonable
person would conclude that the debtor was insolvent.119 Because
the new section lacks this reasonableness standard, it will allow
trustees to avoid transfers that do not implicate any legitimate in-
sider preference concerns. For example, a trustee could invoke the
new section to avoid a transfer in which a debtor repaid an honest
family debt eleven months before filing a bankruptcy petition,
even though the debtor did not intend to deny other creditors their
rightful share of the estate and the creditor had no reason to know
of the debtor's insolvency.
Advocates of the new insider preference provision certainly
could advance cogent reasons for Congress' removal of the "reason-
able cause to believe" language. 20 Regardless of whether the
amendment was necessary or proper, however, it is now the law. If
an insider receives an apparently preferential transfer from the
debtor within one year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
trustee no longer needs to prove that the insider had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer to recoup the transferred assets for the estate.
B. Exclusion for Preferential Transfers of Less Than Six Hundred
Dollars
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act also added a new subsection
(7) to Code section 547(c). 121 The new subsection provides that the
trustee may not avoid an otherwise avoidable transfer "if, in a case
filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer
debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is af-
fected by such transfer is less than $600. ''122 This new provision
not only creates the problem of identifying "an individual debtor
whose debts are primarily consumer debts,"' 23 but it also leaves
many other questions unanswered.
119. See Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 221, 223 (1980).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 178-79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 6138-39.
121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(7) (West Supp. 1985).
122. Id.
123. "Consumer debts" are debts "incurred by an individual primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose." 11 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1982); see In re Burgess, 22 Bankr. 771,
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One such question is how the court should determine when "the
aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by
such transfer is less than $600." Interpreted literally, section
547(c)(7) seems to apply to single transfers only, because the intro-
ductory language of section 547(c) speaks in terms of a single
transfer and the new subsection (7) refers to "such transfer." In
spite of this language, the new section appears to extend to aggre-
gations of value involving the transfer of several types of property
in a single transaction between the debtor and a single creditor.
For example, suppose the debtor made three monthly payments of
$250 to a creditor in repayment of a consumer loan, that each of
these transfers occurred less than ninety days before the debtor
filed the bankruptcy petition, and that the transfers otherwise sat-
isfied the preference criteria of section 547(b). 124 In this situation,
the "aggregate value" of property transferred to the creditor dur-
ing the preference period would be $750 but the value of each indi-
vidual transfer would be only $250. Because the language of sec-
tion 547(c)(7) suggests that it applies to individual transfers, each
$250 transfer would be protected. Suppose, however, that the
debtor simultaneously transferred a $500 automobile and $500 in
cash to the same creditor. Under section 547(c)(7), the two ele-
ments of the transaction must be aggregated. As a result, the
transfer would be valued at $1000 and it would fall outside the
772-73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982). A court which applied this definition to the new "primar-
ily consumer debts" language of section 547(c)(7) could focus either on the number of debts
which met the definition, the dollar amount of these debts, or a combination of the two. See,
e.g., In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (finding that consumer debts ex-
ceeded other debts both in number and amount, and section 707(b) was applicable); supra
note 25. Even if the courts settle this question, they still will face the difficulty of determin-
ing whether certain claims against the debtor relate to consumer debts. For example, a claim
for damages caused by the debtor's negligent operation of an automobile has been held not
to be a consumer debt because it was not incurred primarily for a personal, family, or house-
hold purpose. If a court found that the damage claim was not a consumer debt, however,
and it looked at the dollar amount of claims rather than the number of claims when it
applied the "consumer debts" definition, it could find that an individual with a large tort
judgment against him did not incur "primarily consumer debts" notwithstanding that the
debtor never engaged in a business. See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985);
supra note 25. Congress could eliminate this problem by changing section 547(c)(7) to make
it apply to "consumer debtors," and defining "consumer debtors" as individuals whose con-
sumer debts exceed debts incurred for business purposes in dollar amount.
124. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); see supra note 101 and accompany-
ing text.
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protection of section 547(c)(7). Only if the debtor had transferred
the two kinds of property separately would section 547(c)(7) shel-
ter each transfer from a trustee's preference attack.
Like the other exceptions to preference recoveries set out in sec-
tion 547(c), the section 547(c)(7) exception is of the all-or-nothing
variety. To the extent that the exception is operative, it will pro-
tect the transfer in its entirety. If the transfer value equals or ex-
ceeds $600, however, the trustee may avoid the entire transfer, not
just the amount over $600. This all-or-nothing nature could be-
come even more burdensome for creditors if a court construed the
aggregation directive of section 547(c)(7) to require the aggregation
of all transfers to a particular creditor during the preference
period, as a court conceivably could do in spite of the "single
transfer" language in the section. 1 5 If a court interpreted section
547(c)(7) in this manner, a creditor who received a potentially
preferential transfer and feared the debtor might file a bankruptcy
petition would be well advised to accept no more than $599 in pay-
ments during any ninety day period. In this way, the creditor still
could qualify for the full protection of section 547(c)(7). The most
effective way to avoid section 547(c)(7) problems, however, would
be for the creditor to obtain a security interest of $599 or less in
the debtor's property.126 The creditor thus could avoid the trus-
tee's potential preference attack by adding $599 to the amount of
debt secured by the collateral through a series of "separate"
transfers. 12
125. A court which interpreted section 547(c)(7) in this manner still would have to deter-
mine how much of a transfer was avoidable. The trustee obviously would prefer to avoid the
entire transfer, but the court could decide to limit the trustee's recovery to amounts trans-
ferred in excess of $600.
126. The debtor's grant of a security interest is a transfer of property which may consti-
tute a voidable preference if it satisfies all the requirements of § 547(b). Section 101(48)
defines a "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, includ-
ing retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(48) (West Supp. 1985); see, e.g., Time Oil Co. v. Wolverton, 491
F.2d 361, 364-65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); In re Loe Prod., Inc., 1 BANK.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 1301, 1303 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1975).
127. The trustee could attack the transfers, however, by claiming that the debtor made
them "with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" other creditors. 11 U.S.C.A. §
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Section 547(c)(7) contains problems even more fundamental
than its difficulty in application or its potential loopholes. As en-
acted, section 547(c)(7) does not advance the purposes which an
exception to the preference provisions should achieve. The reasons
originally advanced to support the exception were that small pay-
ments made in the ordinary course of the debtor's financial affairs
generally do not result from significant creditor pressure on the eve
of bankruptcy, and that the small preference recoveries trustees
might obtain without this exception probably would be consumed
by the administrative costs associated with the effort, leaving noth-
ing to distribute to other creditors on a pro rata basis.128 As en-
acted, however, the new exception actually may increase the likeli-
hood of creditor pressure on debtors. Creditors may pressure a
debtor to pay obligations in a manner which aids the creditors'
ability to qualify for the exception in the event that the debtor
seeks bankruptcy relief shortly thereafter. By orchestrating trans-
actions to gain the protection of section 547(c)(7), creditors could
push a debtor into filing for bankruptcy relief. Because these credi-
tors all have the same interest and simultaneously could seek to
enter into transactions with the debtor to obtain section 547(c)(7)
protection, the potential for this scenario is high. The new exemp-
tion will protect creditors in these situations from any preference
attack by the trustee even though the transactions were conducted
outside both the ordinary course of the debtor's financial affairs
and the ordinary course of the creditors' businesses and the credi-
tors had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the transaction
548(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The debtor should be able to defend against the attack, how-
ever, by claiming that the transfers were intended not to defraud any other creditors, but
rather to repay one creditor.
128. See Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 93 (Recommending Note accompanying Pro-
posed Consumer Bankruptcy Improvements Act). The consumer credit industry proposed to
limit protection from preference attacks to transfers which met three conditions: (1) the
transfers occurred during the preference period for the repayment of consumer debts; (2)
the transfers occurred in the ordinary course of both the debtor's and the transferee's finan-
cial affairs; and-(3) the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee did not exceed $750.
Id. at 92 (section 10). The requirement that transfers be in the ordinary course of business,
however, was not included in the version enacted by Congress. As a result, the arguments
advanced by the consumer credit industry to support its own proposal do not fully support
the preference exception which Congress adopted. Moreover, both the industry proposal and
the final version limit the exception to individual debtors, even though the policies underly-
ing the exception apply just as strongly to business bankruptcy proceedings.
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that the debtor was insolvent. The addition of section 547(c)(7),
therefore, may encourage the specific conduct that Congress in-
tended to discourage through the preference provisions.
C. Repayment of Debts in the Ordinary Course of Business
The third change which Congress made to the preference rules,
like the first change discussed in this section, was made by a "mis-
cellaneous" amendment to section 547(c)(2). 2 e Under the original
Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee could not avoid transfers
of a debtor's property in payment of debts incurred by the debtor
not more than forty-five days before the payment if the payment
was made in the ordinary course of the debtor's and creditor's
business or financial affairs.130 The Bankruptcy Amendments Act
removed the time limitation in section 547(c)(2). As a result, if the
debtor pays a debt during the preference period, and both the debt
and the payment were in the ordinary course of the debtor's and
the creditor's business or financial affairs, the transfer is not a
voidable preference.
By removing the forty-five day limitation, Congress expanded
the protection of section 547(c)(2) to a wide variety of transactions
which it previously deemed unworthy of protection. Under the new
section, for example, installment payments made by the debtor on
or before the date on which the payments would have become de-
linquent are not recoverable as a preference, even if the debtor in-
curred the original debt long ago and the creditor had no other
collateral to secure the obligation. Similarly, the amendment pro-
tects installment debts secured by collateral with a value less than
the total outstanding indebtedness as long as the debtor makes the
payments according to the installment repayment schedule.13' The
number of otherwise preferential transfers that may fall under this
subsection is limited only by the requirement that the repayment
must be made in the ordinary course of both the debtor's and cred-
itor's business or financial affairs. Consequently, virtually all
timely payments of installment obligations will be protected under
129. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1985)); see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
131. See, e.g., Barash v. Public Fin. Co., 658 F.2d 504, 512 (7th Cir. 1981).
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section 547(c)(2) because timely payments almost always are in the
ordinary course of the creditor's business and the ordinary course
of the debtor's financial affairs.
Because late or early payments usually would not be in the ordi-
nary course of the debtor's affairs, section 547(c)(2) may not pro-
tect the creditor when some or all of the debtor's payments were
untimely. This conclusion is not inescapable, however. For exam-
ple, if the debtor paid only some obligations on time, the creditor
might argue successfully that the exception should apply because
the ordinary course of the debtor's financial affairs was the current
payment only of selected debts. Even if the debtor made all his
payments on delinquent or future obligations, the creditor could
assert under certain circumstances that the repayment of selected
debts was the ordinary course of the debtor's financial affairs. This
argument might be persuasive, for example, if the debtor had a
history of making payments in the same manner as the allegedly
preferential transfers in question.
Creditors also may contend that the receipt of delinquent pay-
ments or prepayments is the ordinary course of their business af-
fairs. This contention would be especially probative if the debtor's
payment history with the particular creditor is similar to the pay-
ment history during the preference period. Creditors who face po-
tential preference attacks by bankruptcy trustees, therefore,
should examine the debtor's entire payment history to determine if
section 547(c)(2) is available to protect the transfers. If a payment
history sufficient to support a section 547(c)(2) defense is not
available, the creditor should review the debtor's general credit
history and repayment habits to bolster a defense to any prefer-
ence challenge. Section 547(c)(2) also may work in tandem with
the new exception in subsection (c)(7)132 to provide creditors with
multiple protection against preference attacks. For example, if a
debtor made both current and delinquent payments to a creditor
within a single preference period, the creditor could employ section
547(c)(2) to protect the current payments and section 547(c)(7) to
132. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(7) (West Supp. 1985) (exclusion for preferential transfers of less
than $600); see supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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protect separate payments on the delinquent amounts up to $600
per payment.13 3
The three changes Congress made to the Code's preference pro-
visions in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act have strengthened
substantially creditors' ability to defend preference actions in con-
sumer bankruptcy cases. The "safe harbor" created by subsection
(c)(2) is especially significant. This exception seems broad enough
to encourage creditors to raise the defense in all but the most egre-
gious cases of repayment of consumer obligations during the ninety
days immediately before the bankruptcy filing.
VII. DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
Congress also made several changes in the dischargeability pro-
visions which will affect consumer bankruptcy cases. Specifically,
Congress expanded the category of nondischargeable alimony and
child support claims, 34 excepted from discharge certain debts con-
nected with injuries and property damage caused by a debtor's in-
toxicated driving, 3 5 and eliminated dischargeability for consumer
debts for luxury items and credit card advances obtained shortly
before the bankruptcy petition was filed. 36 Congress also altered
section 523(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to reduce the likelihood
that attorney fees will be awarded to consumer debtors who suc-
cessfully defend dischargeability cases brought under section
523(a)(2).13 7
A. Nondischargeable Alimony and Child Support Claims
The general rule of section 523(a)(5) is that debts for "alimony
to, maintenance for, or support of [the debtor's] spouse or child, in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other
order of a court of record or property settlement agreement" are
133. The delinquent amounts also might be protected under section 547(c)(2) if the credi-
tor could establish that the delinquent payments were in the ordinary course of the debtor's
and creditor's business or financial affairs. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
134. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
135. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9) (West Supp. 1985).
136. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C).
137. Id. § 523(d).
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nondischargeable if the "liability is actually in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support" and the original obligee has not
assigned the claim to another entity.138 Under the original Code,
assignment to another entity always rendered the debt dischargea-
ble in the hands of the assignee. 39 In 1981, however, Congress
adopted an exception to section 523(c)(5) under which claims as-
signed pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act
retained their nondischargeable character. 140  The Bankruptcy
Amendments Act further expanded the protection of government
assignees by providing that debts assigned "to the federal govern-
ment or to a state or any political subdivision of such state" also
will remain nondischargeable. 4 Thus, contrary to prior law,142 as-
signment of child support claims to state or local governmental
agencies no longer will make these debts dischargeable.
In addition to government assignees of child support and ali-
mony claims, Congress added another category of claimants to the
coverage of section 523(a)(5). Originally, the only claims made non-
dischargeable by this section were claims arising out of separation
agreements, divorce decrees, or property settlement agreements. 43
Some courts, applying this language literally, had held debts for
child support due under paternity orders dischargeable. 4 4 Con-
gress closed this loophole by amending the language of section
523(a)(5) to include any "other order of a court of record" that
establishes liability for alimony, maintenance, or support. 45 As a
result, debts for child support arising from paternity actions now
138. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5)(A) (West Supp.
1985); see Connecticut v. Glidden, 653 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143
(1982).
140. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2334(b), 95 Stat.
357, 863 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A)).
141. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5)(A)' (West Supp. 1985).
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Lake County Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. Marino, 29 Bankr. 797, 801 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (claim had not been assigned, but a
court had directed that support payments be made directly to the welfare department;
bankruptcy court nevertheless found the debt dischargeable).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
144. Fenstermacher v. Irmer, 31 Bankr. 77, 78 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1983). Contra Balthazor v.
Winnebago County, 36 Bankr. 656, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984).
145. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
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are nondischargeable. No good reason had existed for distinguish-
ing child support ordered in a divorce decree from child support
required by a paternity order. This amendment, therefore, repre-
sents an appropriate expansion of nondischargeability protection.
B. Other New Categories of Nondischargeable Claims
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act also created two nondis-
chargeable claim categories which relate closely to previously ex-
isting nondischargeable claim categories. The first category, claims
against debtors who drive while intoxicated and cause injuries or
property damage146 may be considered a subcategory of willful and
malicious injury claims, which already were nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(6). 47 The second, claims for luxury items and
credit card advances obtained shortly before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy 1 48 actually is a subcategory of fraudulently obtained
money, property, or services claims, which already were nondis-
chargeable under section 523(a)(2).' 49 To understand the scope and
purpose of these new categories, one must consider the treatment
of these claims both before and after Congress enacted the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
1. Claims for Injury or Property Damage Attributed to Driving
While Intoxicated
Section 523(a)(6) of the original Code' 50 and section 17(a)(2) of
the old Bankruptcy Act' 51 each declared debts nondischargeable if
they arose from willful and malicious injuries inflicted by the
debtor upon another entity or its property. Persons injured by
debtors who were driving while intoxicated often sought to have
their claims against the debtor held nondischargeable under these
146. Id. § 523(a)(9).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982); see, e.g., Prosch v. Wooten, 30 Bankr. 357, 358-59
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Long v. Greenwell, 21 Bankr. 419, 420-21 (S.D. Ohio 1982). But see
In re Kuepper, 36 Bankr. 680, 682 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983); In re Poore, 37 Bankr. 246, 250
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982); Clair v. Oakes, 24 Bankr. 766, 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
148. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
149. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
150. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982).
151. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
35(a)(2) (1964), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2), (a)(8) (1970)) (repealed 1978).
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sections.152 These attempts enjoyed mixed success. Some courts
held the debts nondischargeable because drunken driving was suf-
ficiently reckless to constitute willful and malicious conduct.153
Reaching the same result, other courts suggested that the debtor
acted willfully and maliciously because the debtor drove with
knowledge that an intoxicated driver was more likely to injure
others than a sober driver.154 Other courts, however, held the
claims dischargeable because the debtor had not intended specifi-
cally to injury the claimants. 155
In the 1984 amendments, Congress added section 523(a)(9),
which provides that a debt will not be dischargeable if it was cre-
ated by a "judgment or consent decree entered by a court of rec-
ord" finding that the debtor operated "a motor vehicle while le-
gally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction
within the United States or its territories" and caused injuries to
persons or property.15 The limitation relating to judgments and
consent decrees may cause some problems. The existence of the
limitation suggests that these claims still are dischargeable unless,
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, a court of record had en-
tered a final order which determined that the debtor injured the
creditor by driving while intoxicated. The amendment does not ex-
plain how bankruptcy courts should treat these debts if no court
has resolved the underlying cause of action. Because a bankruptcy
court does not have jurisdiction to hear personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims,1 57 it cannot resolve the underlying issue of liabil-
ity. The creditor must establish the claim in a federal district court
or an appropriate state court. 58 The bankruptcy court also cannot
hold the bankruptcy proceedings in abeyance pending the outcome
of the tort litigation because it would unduly delay the administra-
tion of the case.
152. For a listing of some representative cases, see supra note 147.
153. See, e.g., Prosch v. Wooten, 30 Bankr. 357, 358-59 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
154. See, e.g., Long v. Greenwell, 21 Bankr. 419, 420-21 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
155. See, e.g., In re Kuepper, 36 Bankr. 680, 682 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1983); In re Poore, 37
Bankr. 246, 250 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982); Clair v. Oakes, 24 Bankr. 766, 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982).
156. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9) (West Supp. 1985).
157. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
158. See id.
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Section 523(c) may resolve the problem. This provision requires
only those creditors holding claims alleged to be nondischargeable
under subsections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) to file complaints to deter-
mine the dischargeability of their debts." 9 Injured creditors who
hold section 523(a)(9) claims need not seek a dischargeability de-
termination from the bankruptcy court because section 523(a)(9)
does not appear on the list in section 523(c). Section 523(a)(9)
debts automatically are nondischargeable once an appropriate
court determines that the injury was caused by the debtor's intoxi-
cated driving.160 Nonetheless, prudent counsel for parties injured
by intoxicated drivers should consider seeking relief from the stay
to pursue the action against the debtor and, in appropriate circum-
stances, a specific exception from the discharge for the creditor's
claim in the event that a nonbankruptcy court subsequently enters
judgment against the debtor.
2. Claims Relating to Luxury Good Purchases and Credit Card
Advances
The second new category of exceptions to discharge is contained
in section 523(a)(2)(C). This section makes claims nondischarge-
able if they result either from the debtor's purchase of luxury
goods or services worth more than $500 within forty days before
the order for relief or from cash advances to the debtor of more
than $1000 made within twenty days before the order for relief.161
Because section 523(c) specifically mentions section 523(a)(2) ,162 a
creditor holding such a claim must initiate an adversary proceed-
ing in the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of
the associated debt. 6 ' If the creditor does not act in a timely fash-
ion, the bankruptcy court will discharge the claim. 16
159. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West Supp. 1985).
160. See id. § 523(a)(9).
161. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C).
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West Supp. 1985).
164. Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) sets a time limit on creditors' ability to exercise their rights
under section 523(c) to object to dischargeability. The rule provides:
A complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to § 523(c)
of the Code shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first date set for
the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a). The court shall give all
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By adding this category of nondischargeable debts, Congress in-
tended to prevent debtors from "loading up" before they file for
bankruptcy by purchasing many items for which they do not in-
tend to pay. 6 5 Although these claims arguably were nondischarge-
able already under section 523(a)(2)(A), 6 s the enactment of sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(c) removes any doubt. Creditors no longer have to
prove that the debtor incurred these obligations without an intent
to repay to make the debts nondischargeable. 67
As presently drafted, however, section 523(a)(2)(C) contains lan-
guage which may lead to the discharge of some claims Congress
intended to include in the exception to dischargeability. The major
shortcoming of the amendment is that it sets a time limit on its
coverage of these debts. As a result, the debtor may avoid the
statute simply by not filing for bankruptcy until the relatively
short time period provided in the new section has passed. If the
debtor waits twenty-one days to file a bankruptcy petition, or
forty-one days if credit card advances are involved, the claims will
not be governed by section 523(a)(2)(C). The claims might be non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A), 6 8 but creditors who at-
tempt to gain nondischargeable status under this section must
creditors not less than 30 days notice of the time so fixed in the manner pro-
vided in Rule 2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice,
the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The mo-
tion shall be made before the time has expired.
Bankr. Rule 4007(c), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984). A bankruptcy court may dismiss the claim of
a creditor who does not comply with the time limit. See American Express Co. v. Waldman,
33 Bankr. 328, 330-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
165. See 130 CONG. REc. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act "curbs incentives for debt-ridden consumers to go on credit
card spending sprees shortly before filing for bankruptcy"); ABA Consumer Bankruptcy
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Consumer Fin. Serv., Report and Recommendations, 2 N. ILL.
U.L. REv. 239, 271-72 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
166. See infra note 179; see, e.g., In re Black, 373 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
See generally Zaretsky, Intent to Repay, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1073 (1977).
167. The amendment to § 523(a)(2) creates a presumption of nondischargeability for
specified debts. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985). The presumption may be
characterized more appropriately as one of fraud rather than nondischargeability. See infra
notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
168. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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prove that the debtor did not intend to repay the debt at the time
it was incurred.16 9
Creditors generally will not be able to avoid the time limit of
section 523(a)(2)(C) by initiating involuntary bankruptcy proceed-
ings against debtors because the time limits are based on the date
that the court enters an order for relief and not the date on which
the bankruptcy petition is filed.1' 0 When a creditor files an invol-
untary petition, the debtor has twenty days to respond. 7 1 If the
debtor denies the creditor's allegations in the answer, the bank-
ruptcy court probably could not resolve the issue and grant an or-
der for relief within the next twenty days."72 Because the twenty
and forty day time limits in section 523(a)(2)(C) will pass before
the court grants the order for relief, the creditor will not be able to
qualify for nondischargeability under this section. In short, the
debtor and his attorney always can avoid nondischargeability
under section 523(a)(2)(C) by waiting to file a voluntary petition
until the time period expires and by objecting to any involuntary
proceedings filed by creditors. Consequently, the addition of sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(C) should have only a slight effect on nondis-
chargeability under the Bankruptcy Code.
Another problem with the new section is that it provides only a
presumption that debts from "loading up" are nondischargeable.
Because nondischargeability only is presumed, bankruptcy courts
169. See generally Zaretsky, The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANK. L.J. 253 (1979).
170. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
171. Bankr. Rule 1011(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
172. The debtor need not respond to the summons and complaint until twenty days after
service. Id. If the debtor denies the allegations in the complaint, the creditor immediately
could file a motion for summary judgment. Id. Rule 7056 (FED. R. Civ. P. 56, governing
summary judgments, applies in "adversary proceedings"); id. Rule 1018 (Rule 7056 applies
in all "proceedings related to a contested involuntary petition"). FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) re-
quires that the debtor receive at least ten days notice of a hearing on the creditor's motion
for summary judgment. Because of these procedural obstacles, the presumption of nondis-
chargeability will not apply in an involuntary bankruptcy case unless the court shortens the
time for the debtor to respond to the complaint and motion, Bankr. Rule 9006(c), 11
U.S.C.A. (West 1984), or the creditor files the involuntary bankruptcy petition within ten
days after the debtor makes a credit purchase of luxury goods covered by § 523(a)(2)(C).
The presumption in involuntary cases is eliminated entirely for credit card cash advances,
unless a court order under Rule 9006(c) has mandated an extraordinarily expedited re-
sponse to the creditor's petition, because the applicable time limit is only twenty days, not
forty. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
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should permit debtors to rebut the presumption. For example, if a
debtor could show an intent to repay the debt at the time it was
incurred, and a financial status Which made that intent reasonable,
the court should discharge the debt 1 3 unless the creditor can carry
the ultimate burden of persuasion concerning the debtor's in-
tent. I 4 To carry this burden, the creditor must provide clear and
convincing evidence of the debtor's fraudulent intention and the
creditor's reasonable reliance.'7 5 When a debtor presents credible
evidence to support an intent to repay the debt, therefore, the pro-
ceeding will resemble a dischargeability determination under the
pre-amendment provisions of section 523(a)(2). As a result, the
presumption included in the language of section 523(a)(2)(C) will
limit even further the impact of the section upon dischargeability
determinations under the Code.
Creditors and debtors also may face a definitional problem in
section 523(a)(2)(C) litigation.' 7 The term "luxury goods or ser-
vices" appears in quotes as if it were self-defining.1 77 Congress' im-
precise wording will invite prolonged litigation because courts will
have to determine what a "luxury" is every time a creditor seeks to
invoke the new provision. Obvious cases, such as debts for rent on
an apartment, purchase of staple grocery items or, on the other
end of the spectrum, the purchase of a "big screen" television by a
debtor who already owns a working color television set, will not
cause interpretational problems. In these situations, the creditor
on the losing end would be ill-advised to contest the issue because
such a contest could trigger liability for the debtor's attorney fees
at the conclusion of the case.'7 8 The gray area between these ex-
tremes, however, is substantial. For example, the court could not
173. See Zaretsky, supra note 166, at 1081-83.
174. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(g) (West Supp. 1985). The shift of the burden back to the
creditor after the debtor presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption is an applica-
tion of the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions. See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
175. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) 523.08[5] (15th ed. 1985).
176. The provisions concerning cash advances under an "open end credit plan" should
not cause a problem because that term is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (1985) (regulatory interpretation).
177. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
178. Id. § 523(d); see infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text; cf. American Express
Co. v. Waldman, 33 Bankr. 328, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court suggested that pre-
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decide easily whether mechanical repairs on a debtor's pleasure
craft were luxury services. The services certainly relate to a luxury
item, but the services themselves arguably are not a luxury in the
same sense that an ocean cruise would be a luxury. The purchase
of an expensive antique dining koom table when the debtor could
have purchased another table for one tenth of the price also would
cause interpretational problems. Should the determination be dif-
ferent if the debtor owned no other table? What if the debtor al-
ready owned matching chairs?
These questions cannot be answered simply by considering the
statutory language. Courts must address these issues on a case-by-
case basis, and the likelihood of arriving at a consensus is not
great. Too many goods and services will fall under this provision to
allow the courts to establish a uniform test quickly or easily. The
problem is complicated further by the question of whether courts
should consider a debtor's socioeconomic background when deter-
mining if a particular item is a "luxury" item.
The problems courts will face in defining "luxury" for the pur-
poses of section 523(a)(2)(C) will detract significantly from the
usefulness of the provision. The problems created by the time limi-
tations on nondischargeability and the rebutability of the pre-
sumption in the new section will have a similarly negative impact.
Given these difficulties and the availability of section 523(a)(2)(A)
as an alternative method of establishing nondischargeability, 17 9 the
value of section 523(a)(2)(C) as an addition to the Bankruptcy
Code is open to serious question.
C. Chapter 13 and the New Categories of Nondischargeable Debts
The provisions of Chapter 13 also may significantly limit the ef-
fectiveness of the recent amendments creating new categories of
nondischargeable debts. Claims arising from driving while intoxi-
cated, credit card advances, and purchases of luxury goods still
may be discharged under the full payment discharge provision of
bankruptcy shopping spree "established a prima facie case that [the] debt was nondis-
chargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(A)," although it dismissed the case because
the creditor failed to file a timely complaint).
179. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (exception to discharge for "false pre-
tenses, a false representation, or actual fraud").
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Chapter 13.180 Changes to Chapter 13 provisions made in the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act may reduce the effect of the Chapter
13 full payment discharge,181 but these provisions do not eliminate
the possibility that otherwise nondischargeable claims may be dis-
charged under Chapter 13 and the full payment discharge provi-
sion. The impact of such an occurrence would he substantial be-
cause each category of otherwise nondischargeable claims could
involve a substantial sum of money. For example, damage claims
by individuals injured because of the debtor's drunk driving could
exceed other claims against the debtor by tenfold or more. 8 2 The
debtor also could incur massive debts for luxury goods and services
by "loading up" just before filing for bankruptcy. 83 Consequently,
partial payment of these claims under a Chapter 13 plan could re-
sult in a full discharge even though Congress clearly indicated in
Section 523 that the claims should be completely non-
dischargeable.
D. Debtors' Attorney Fees Associated with Dischargeability
Determinations
The final change which Congress made to the Code's dis-
chargeability provisions in 1984 affected the standard of review
which the court must apply to determine whether debtors who suc-
cessfully defend dischargeability cases under section 523(a)(2) are
entitled to recover attorney fees. Under the original Code, the
court was directed to grant judgment "in favor of the [successful]
180. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982). See generally W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRAc-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 12.03 (1983).
181. For example, new Chapter 13 provisions allow creditors to object to the confirmation
of plans that do not provide for full payment of their claims. The court may not confirm the
debtor's plan in the face of these objections unless the debtor applies all disposable income
to the plan for at least three years. See infra notes 288-347 and accompanying text. More-
over, creditors may propose modifications of a confirmed plan to increase the payments a
debtor must make to complete the plan. See infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text.
These new provisions should operate to increase the amount of payments that Chapter 13
debtors must make, thereby decreasing the extent of prebankruptey debt that they will be
discharging through bankruptcy instead of payment.
182. Cf. In re Keiser, 35 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. D. Del. 1983) (debtor, while intoxicated, shot
two individuals, who obtained a judgement against the debtor for approximately $60,000;
only other claim in the case was a debt fully secured by debtor's automobile).
183. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Waldman, 33 Bankr. 328, 330-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983).
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debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the pro-
ceeding to determine dischargeability, unless such granting of
judgment would be clearly inequitable.' ' 4 The consumer credit in-
dustry objected to this provision and sought to have it amended. 18 5
Congress responded by allowing bankruptcy courts to enter judg-
ment in favor of the debtor for costs and reasonable attorney fees
only "if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not
substantially justified [and, in any event, not] if special circum-
stances would make the award unjust."' 86
The reasons for consumer credit industry dissatisfaction with
the original language of section 523(d) were illustrated in a 1983
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit. In Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Carmen,'" the first circuit court
opinion to construe the section, the court held that the debtor was
entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees because the creditor
failed to produce any evidence that the debtor made a materially
false statement with intent to deceive the creditor.' 8 According to
the court, "the bankruptcy court was required to award fees in
[the] case" because this "primary element" of the creditor's case
was absent."' 8 The dissent, however, asserted that the majority's
ruling left creditors in an untenable position because creditors gen-
erally must prove a debtor's intent to deceive through circumstan-
tial evidence. According to the dissent, even if a creditor presented
circumstantial evidence of the debtor's intent to deceive the credi-
tor, the creditor often would be required to pay attorney fees be-
cause the court might not be persuaded by the creditor's
evidence. 190
The dissenting judge read more into the court's opinion than the
majority actually stated. The court specifically noted that "the
bankruptcy court found that [the creditor] had failed to produce
any evidence on the element of intent to deceive."' 9' The creditor
184. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
185. See Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 84.
186. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
187. 723 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1983).
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 19 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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also did not appeal the bankruptcy court's decision on the dis-
chargeability of the debt, which caused the majority to consider
that issue closed in the appeal and to consider only the award of
attorney fees under section 523(d).192 Contrary to the interpreta-
tion reflected in the dissent, the court established only that if a
creditor fails in an attempt to have the court declare a consumer
debt nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2) because of the cred-
itor's failure to produce any evidence concerning intent to deceive,
the debtor will be able to recover any costs and attorney fees that
were incurred in defending the action. The consumer credit indus-
try, however, reacted in the same way as the dissenting judge in
Thorp Credit. The industry was concerned that other courts would
give Thorp Credit a broad interpretation-an interpretation that
would permit an attorney fee award every time a debtor prevailed
in a dischargeability proceeding, regardless of the reason for the
debtor's success. 193
Congress' amendment to section 523(d) may not resolve the in-
dustry's concerns totally. The amended statute still provides that
the court "shall grant judgment." 9 The legislative history of this
language in the original section suggests that bankruptcy courts
generally should award costs and fees to all debtors who success-
fully defend section 523(a)(2) cases. Although the Senate version of
section 523(d) provided that "the debtor may be awarded costs
and a reasonable attorney's fee for the proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a debt if the court finds that the proceeding was
frivolous or not brought by its creditor in good faith,"'19 5 the House
version provided: "The cost-attorney's fees provision is
mandatory."' 96 The final version fell between these extremes, but
192. See id. at 16.
193. See Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 84.
194. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
195. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 80, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5866 (describing section 523(d) of S. 2266, the Senate version of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978) (emphasis added).
196. See HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 131-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 6092-93 (describing section 523(d) of H.R. 8200, the House version of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). The House version also allowed the court to grant the
debtor "any actual pecuniary damages, such as loss of a day's work, that the debtor might
have suffered as a result of the litigation." Id.
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it bore a much greater resemblance to the House version. 197 Conse-
quently, bankruptcy courts generally focused on the mandatory
language of original section 523(d), and they routinely applied the
House analysis to justify judgments under that section in favor of
debtors. 198
As amended, section 523(d) 199 relaxes the restrictions on courts
that might prefer to deny a debtor's request for costs and fees. The
new section, however, still allows bankruptcy judges to construe
the statute liberally to favor debtors and to award fees and costs.200
By finding that a creditor's case is not substantially justified unless
the creditor offers some strong evidence supporting each element
197. The resemblance to the House version is demonstrated by two distinct similarities.
First, the final version was phrased in the same mandatory fashion as the House version. 11
U.S.C. § 523(d) (1982) ("the court shall grant judgment against such creditor"). Second, the
Senate language requiring that the action not be "frivolous" or "not brought by its creditor
in good faith" was dropped from the final act. Id.
198. E.g., Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Carmen, 723 F.2d 16, 17-18 (6th Cir. 1983); Bank of Co-
lumbia Falls v. Burgess, 22 Bankr. 771, 773 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); New Britain Gen.
Hosp. Employees Credit Union v. Begley, 12 Bankr. 839, 841 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Bene-
ficial Fin. Co. v. Majewski, 7 Bankr. 904, 905-07 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); First Serv. Corp. v.
Schlickmann, 7 Bankr. 139, 141 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
In cases in which debtors were denied awards under the original section 523(d), the courts
focused on the debtors' conduct rather than the creditors' good faith in denying the debtors'
requests for costs and fees. E.g., Camden Nat'l Bank v. Archangeli, 6 Bankr. 50, 53 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1980) (creditor demonstrated debtor's actual intent to deceive, making award of
attorney fees to debtor inequitable). But cf. Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Carmen, 723 F.2d 16, 18
(6th Cir. 1983) (attorney fees awarded because creditor produced no evidence of debtor's
intent to deceive, in spite of dissent's objection that the court clearly was in error in holding
that the creditor had produced no such evidence). Courts justified these decisions by noting
that if a creditor could prove intentional misrepresentation by the debtor, a decision to
award costs and fees to the debtor merely because the creditor could not also prove reasona-
ble reliance on those misrepresentations would be "clearly inequitable." Camden Nat'l
Bank, 6 Bankr. at 53.
199. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
200. These restrictions had been a serious deterrent to courts that wished to exercise dis-
cretion concerning attorney fee awards. For instance, in First Serv. Corp. v. Schlickmann, 7
Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980), the judge lamented:
I am mindful that in interpreting [section 523(d) to require the payment of
attorney fees] as I have, honest creditors who might already be bearing the
burden of a watered-down dividend on the debt owed to them will also be
strapped with the expense of seeking to honestly and faithfully protect their
rights. While in many cases I would be reluctant to saddle creditors with this
additional cost, I feel my hands are tied. Section 523(d) does not provide for
judicial discretion in this manner.
Id. at 140-41.
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of the case, bankruptcy courts could minimize the actual impact of
amended section 523(d). Absent strict appellate court directives,
the amendment to section 523(d) may not alter the actual criteria
for awards of costs and attorney fees applied in some districts.
VIII. CHAPTER 13 AMENDMENTS
Although Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is available to in-
dividuals who conduct a business, 0 1 consumer debtors initiate the
202Cvast majority of Chapter 13 cases. Indeed, Congress intended
Chapter 13 to become more generally used by consumers than its
predecessor under the former Bankruptcy Act, Chapter XIII.20 3
Chapter 13 use had risen,204 but not as much as Congress had
hoped. Moreover, some debtors arguably had abused the system of
relief which Congress intended to make available through Chapter
13.205
Congress addressed the lack of consumer filings and the per-
ceived debtor abuses of Chapter 13 through several changes con-
tained in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act. One of these changes,
the notification requirements designed to encourage consumers to
choose Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, is discussed earlier in
this Article. 20 6 The following discussion focuses on the changes
designed to eliminate the perceived abuses of Chapter 13.
201. See, e.g., In re Hoyt, 27 Bankr. 13, 14 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982). See generally Moller, It
Isn't Only for Wage Earners Anymore: The Individual in Business and Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REV. 331 (1980).
202. The most recent available statistics indicate that for the twelve month period ending
June 30, 1983, debtors initiated 7746 business and 94,455 nonbusiness Chapter 13 cases.
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 420 (table F-3A).
203. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 117-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 6077-79.
204. Compare supra note 202 (102,201 Chapter 13 cases commenced in the twelve-month
period ending June 30, 1983) with DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1979
ANNUAL REPORT A-118 (table F-2) (39,442 Chapter XII cases commenced in the last full
fiscal year of operation of the old Bankruptcy Act).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Eustus, 695 F.2d 311, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding an
abuse which prevented confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(3), requiring that the debtor propose the plan in "good faith"); Hearings, Part I,
supra note 7, at 106-43 (testimony and statement of Paul J. Pfeilsticker, representing the
Consumer Bankers Ass'n); ABA Report, supra note 165, at 257-58.
206. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
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A. The Codebtor Stay
Among the innovations Congress adopted in the original Bank-
ruptcy Code was a codebtor stay in Chapter 13 cases.20 7 Section
1301 of the original Code prohibited creditors from attempting to
collect debts "from any individual that is liable on such debt with
the debtor, or that secured such debt," for the duration of the
Chapter 13 proceedings, unless the codebtor was a compensated
surety.20 Creditors with claims against codebtors could obtain re-
lief from the stay under section 1301(c). This subsection allowed
the court to grant relief if the creditor could demonstrate: (1) that
the codebtor actually received consideration for the claim held by
the creditor, (2) that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan proposed not to
pay the claim, or (3) that the creditor's interest would be harmed
irreparably by a continuation of the stay.20 9
Although some creditors sought relief from the codebtor stay
under the original Code by attempting to demonstrate that the
first 210 or third211 condition had been met, most creditors sought
relief from the stay by trying to prove that the debtor's plan pro-
posed not to pay the creditor's claim.212 Unsecured creditors often
were able to demonstrate that this condition existed because Chap-
ter 13 required a debtor to pay creditors only that which they
would have received in a Chapter 7 proceeding.2 3 Because debtors
without significant nonexempt property often would have paid lit-
tle or nothing to unsecured creditors under Chapter 7, they were
able to propose Chapter 13 plans under which they paid little or
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301(c) (West 1979 & Supp.
1985).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(1) (1982); see, e.g., In re Sandifer, 34 Bankr. 507, 508-09 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1983).
211. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(3) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301(c)(3) (West Supp.
1985); see, e.g., In re Burton, 4 Bankr. 608, 609-10 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(2) (1982); see, e.g., Household Fin. Co. v. Hansberry, 20 Bankr.
870, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Abraham & Straus v. Francis, 15 Bankr. 998, 999 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981); Mid Maine Mut. Say. Bank v. Johnson, 12 Bankr. 894, 895-96 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1981); Timex Fed. Credit Union v. DiDomizio, 11 Bankr. 357, 359 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Leger, 4 Bankr. 718, 720 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982).
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nothing to unsecured creditors.214 If the unsecured creditors also
held claims against codebtors, as was often the case, the section
1301 stay prevented the creditors from pursuing these claims. In
this situation, creditors usually sought relief from the stay by
showing that the second condition had been met.21 5
The issue in most cases that arose under the original version of
section 1301(c)(2) was whether the debtor's plan would pay the
creditor's claim in full.216 The court usually did not conduct exten-
sive fact finding or formal hearings to resolve the issues raised. In-
stead, the court simply determined whether the debtor's Chapter
13 plan proposed to satisfy the creditor's claim in full.217 If part of
the debt would remain unpaid under the plan, the court usually
modified the stay to permit the creditor to collect the unsatisfied
portion from the codebtor. This judicial relief adequately protected
the interests of creditors who held claims against codebtors, but it
required too much time, especially considering that the cases
rarely involved any disputes concerning material facts.
Congress addressed this problem in the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments Act by adding a new subsection (d) to section 1301. Subsec-
tion (d) requires the court to terminate the codebtor stay twenty
days after a creditor files a request for relief under section
1301(c)(2) "unless the debtor or any individual that is liable on
such debt with the debtor files and serves upon [the creditor] a
written objection to the [requested relief]." 218s The new subsection
does not change the substantive grounds for relief from the stay. It
merely forces the debtor or codebtor who would receive the benefit
of the stay to act to protect that benefit if the creditor seeks relief
from the codebtor stay under section 1301(c)(2).
If the debtor or codebtor believes that the debtor's proposed
plan will pay the creditor's claim in full, the new subsection re-
quires a written objection to the creditor's action to preserve the
protection of the stay. If the court faced such an objection, it pre-
sumably would schedule a hearing promptly to decide the issue. If
214. See generally Cyr, supra note 10, at 271.
215. See supra note 212.
216. See, e.g., Household Fin. Corp. v. Jacobsen, 20 Bankr. 648, 649-50 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982).
217. See id.
218. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301(d) (West Supp. 1985).
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the debtor's proposed plan did not provide for full payment of the
creditor's claim, the court would not continue to protect the debtor
and codebtor because the creditor would collect more from the
codebtor if the stay were lifted than the creditor would collect
under the debtor's plan.21e If the debtor or codebtor fails to object,
however, the court must grant relief to the creditor within twenty
days after the creditor's request was filed. Section 1301(d) repre-
sents a significant improvement because it provides relief from the
stay which properly recognizes creditor interests, but it does not
reduce the protection for Chapter 13 debtors and codebtors that
Congress deemed appropriate.
B. The Debtor's Repayment Plan
In Chapter 13 cases, the most significant document is the
debtor's repayment plan. The plan contains the debtor's proposal
to creditors for the repayment of outstanding claims. Notwith-
standing the great significance of the plan, the Bankruptcy Code
allows the debtor substantial flexibility to determine the contents
of the plan.22 0 Section 1322 of the Code2 ' states only that the
debtor's plan must provide for the submission of assets sufficient
to fund the plan,2 the full payment of priority claims,2 3 identical
treatment for all claims within a particular class, 22 4 and repayment
within three years unless the court specifically approves a longer
period. 225 Aside from these mandatory requirements, the Code per-
mits the debtor to include a virtually unlimited number of other
provisions relating to the treatment of claims.2 6
219. Section 1301(c)(2) (1982) states that relief from the codebtor stay should be granted
only "to the extent that. . . the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim."
11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
220. See generally W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, supra note 180, at §§ 9.01-.12 (discussion of
required and permissible provisions of Chapter 13 plans).
221. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1982).
223. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
224. Id. § 1322(a)(3).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982).
226. Section 1322(b) contains nine categories of provisions which a Chapter 13 plan may
include. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(1)-(9) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Section 1322(b)(10) also
allows the debtor to "include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with [the
Bankruptcy Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (1982). The only limitation on the permissive
[Vol. 27:91140
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REFORM
1. Classification of Claims
Although the Code requires identical treatment of all claims
within a particular class,227 the debtor need not classify claims in
any particular manner.22s The only requirement is that the debtor
"may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated" if
the debtor chooses to classify claims. 229 If a Chapter 13 debtor does
choose to classify claims, each claim within each class must receive
identical treatment, 23 0 and the classification of unsecured claims
must not result in unfair discrimination against any designated
class.231
The Bankruptcy Code also suggests that Chapter 13 debtors
should classify claims in the manner recognized for Chapter 11
cases in Code section 1122.232 Section 1122(a) permits a debtor to
"place a claim . . . in a particular class only if such claim . . . is
substantially similar to the other claims . . . of such class.233 Be-
cause section 1322(a)(3) already provides that all claims within the
same class must receive identical treatment,234 section 1122(a) does
not affect a debtor's classification decisions significantly. Section
1122(b), however, permits the debtor to designate "a separate class
of claims consisting only of every unsecured claim that is less than
or reduced to an amount that the court approves as reasonable and
necessary for administrative convenience. 235 This section recog-
nizes that the full payment of small claims often is more economi-
cally feasible and administratively convenient than the full pay-
ment of other larger claims with the same legal status.236 Because
provisions of Chapter 13 plans is that they cannot conflict directly with other Code provi-
sions. Id.
227. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
228. See id. § 1322(b)(1) (providing that the debtor "may" classify claims).
229. Id.
230. Id. § 1322(a)(3). But see In re Sellers, 33 Bankr. 854, 858-59 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983)
(while noting that creditors in same class must receive identical treatment, the court
deemed payment of $1 to each creditor to be permissible even if not pro rata because any
"unequal" treatment was de minimis).
231. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
232. See id. (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1982)).
233. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1982).
234. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
235. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (1982).
236. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 102, at 406, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6362; see also REPORT, PART II, supra note 74, at 241.
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the administrative benefits of a small claims classification are ap-
preciable, the cross-reference to section 1122 in section 1322(b)(1)
most likely was directed at the "administrative convenience classi-
fication" provision of section 1122. Section 1322(b)(1) apparently
still authorizes additional classes of claims, subject to the require-
ment that the debtor must not discriminate unfairly against any
other class. 23 7
The unfair discrimination requirement has caused some courts
to limit the designation of classes to the "administrative conve-
nience classification" of section 1122(b). 3 s Most courts, however,
have held that debtors may classify claims for purposes other than
administrative convenience.3 9 Courts that have permitted other
classifications, however, have not thrown open the doors to any
classification which suits the debtor's fancy. Instead, these courts
have enforced the provision concerning unfair discrimination by
limiting the debtor's capacity to prefer certain claims over others
through classification systems in which some creditors are paid
more than others. 40
Most classification controversies involve attempts to treat "spe-
cial" unsecured claims more favorably than other unsecured
claims. These "special" claims have involved debts to physicians,2 4'
debts to suppliers, 42 and, most frequently, debts guaranteed by
237. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
238. In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 260 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980). The court held that any
separate classification of claims occupying the same legal status results in unfair discrimina-
tion per se, with the sole exception of the administrative convenience classification. Id. at
260-61.
239. E.g., AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 Bankr. 510, 511-12 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982);
In re Moore, 31 Bankr. 12, 16-17 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); Ledford v. McCormick, 27 Bankr.
434, 437 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Dziedzic, 9 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981);
In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 694, 697-99 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980); In re Kovich, 4 Bankr. 403, 406-07
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
240. One court, however, has held that the separation into different classifications of
claims occupying the same legal status is not objectionable even if one class is paid a much
greater percentage of its claims than another class, as long as the creditors in each class
receive at least what they would have received in a Chapter 7 proceeding. In re Sutherland,
3 Bankr. 420, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).
241. E.g., In re Hosler, 12 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 694
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
242. E.g., AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
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relatives or co-workers of the debtor.243 Courts have permitted
these special classifications only if the debtor could show a special
postbankruptcy need for continuing the relationship with the par-
ticular creditor.2 44 Debtors have demonstrated this need in cases
involving physicians 245 and suppliers,246 but they have encountered
greater difficulty in attempting to show adverse ramifications from
failures to pay claims guaranteed by relatives or friends.247
Congress specifically addressed this problem in the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act. The Act amended section 1322(b)(1) to provide
that a debtor's plan "may treat claims for a consumer debt of the
debtor if an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the
debtor differently than other unsecured claims. '24s The new sec-
tion, however, did not delete the requirement that any separate
classification of claims must not unfairly discriminate against any
particular class. 249 The debtor may classify codebtor claims in a
manner which provides different treatment, but the classification
must not result in unfair discrimination against other classes.250
The specific recognition that codebtor claims may be placed in a
separate class, however, strongly suggests that Congress intended
to permit Chapter 13 debtors to pay creditors with claims guaran-
teed by other individuals more than they pay to other creditors,
without having those payments struck down as "unfairly discrimi-
natory." As a result, the courts probably will interpret the amend-
ment in this manner and will consider the new provision a reaction
to earlier decisions that prohibited more favorable treatment of
codebtor claims in Chapter 13 plans.2 51
243. E.g., In re Girardeau, 35 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); In re Montano, 4 Bankr. 535
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1980), affd 13 Bankr. 997 (D.D.C. 1981); In re Kovich, 4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1980); In re McKenzie, 4 Bankr. 88 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Utter, 3
Bankr. 369 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
244. E.g., AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 Bankr. 510, 512 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
245. See In re Hosler, 12 Bankr. 395, 396 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Hill, 4 Bankr.
694, 699 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
246. See AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 Bankr. 510, 512 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
247. For a listing of cases deciding this issue, see In re Cook, 21 Bankr. 650, 651 (Bankr.
D.N.M.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Cook, 9 BAKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 1377 (D.N.M. 1982).
248. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See supra note 247.
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2. Executory Contracts and Leases
Another congressional alteration of section 1322(b) affected the
debtor's ability to accept or reject executory contracts and leases.
Previously, section 1322(b)(7) allowed the debtor to "provide for
the assumption or rejection of any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor not previously rejected under section 365 of
[the Code] .1252 Courts interpreted this provision as giving Chapter
13 debtors full discretion to assume or reject executory contracts
and leases without becoming subject to the restrictive provisions of
section 365.253 Without these restrictions, debtors could assume or
reject executory contracts for their own benefit or for the benefit of
a creditor or a third party25 4 and could use this unrestricted power
to override other Code provisions. For example, a Chapter 13
debtor theoretically could assume an executory contract that com-
mitted a third party to lend money to the debtor. Section 365(c)(2)
might have prevented the debtor from assuming the contract,255
but Chapter 13 debtors did not face that restriction because the
courts had held section 365 inapplicable to Chapter 13 debtors.256
Congress responded to this problem by amending section
1322(b)(7) to provide explicitly that any assumption, rejection, or
assignment of an executory contract or unexpired lease under a
Chapter 13 plan is subject to the provisions of section 365.25" This
change is appropriate because it brings the treatment of executory
contracts and unexpired leases in Chapter 13 cases in line with the
252. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(7) (West Supp.
1985) (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1985)).
253. Benevides v. Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982).
254. See id.; W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, supra note 180, at § 9.10.
255. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982); see Farmer v. Crocker Nat'l Bank (In re Swift Aire
Lines, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 490, 496 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).
256. Benevides v. Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra note 253 and
accompanying text. The courts could have limited a Chapter 13 debtor's ability to assume or
reject executory contracts and unexpired leases on other grounds. For example, the courts
could have denied confirmation of a debtor's plan if they found that assumption of a partic-
ular executory contract would have jeopardized the feasibility of the plan. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
1325(a)(6) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The inapplicability of section 365, however, severely
restricted the courts' ability to control assumption and rejection of executory contracts and
leases.
257. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(7) (West Supp. 1985).
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treatment of these issues in Chapter 11 proceedings.2 58 Although
section 365 is not perfect, 59 it provides detailed guidelines for the
assumption or rejection of executory contracts and unexpired
leases-guidelines which Congress determined to be appropriate in
bankruptcy proceedings. These guidelines should apply equally to
Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 proceedings.
3. Timing and the Chapter 13 Plan
a. Initiation of Payments Under the Plan
The debtor must file a Chapter 13 plan either with the petition
that initiates the case, 60 or within fifteen days after the petition is
filed.261 The court may extend the deadline if the debtor shows
good cause for the delay. 62 Most debtors fie a plan very shortly
after the case commences. The original version of the Code, how-
ever, did not provide any explicit deadline by which the debtor was
required to commence payments under the plan once it was
filed.263
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act provided a deadline in Code
section 1326. Under the new section, the debtor must "commence
making the payments proposed by a plan within thirty days after
the plan is filed. ' 264 The court under the amendment can allow
debtors to refrain from initiating payment until later,265 but the
new section does not provide guidelines for the court to follow
when it makes this decision. The amended section, however, does
appear to anticipate timely payment in the absence of unusual cir-
cumstances. A court faced with a plan that proposes to commence
payments after the thirty day period has passed, therefore, should
consider carefully whether to accept the proposal. For example, if a
Chapter 13 plan proposes to pay debts from the proceeds of a real
258. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
259. See generally Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code,
55 Am. BANKR. L.J. 223 (1981).
260. Bankr. Rule 3015, 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See 11 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (West Supp. 1985).
264. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
265. Id.
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estate sale,2"6 a court generally should not require the debtor to
begin making payments until the debtor liquidates the real estate
and the funds are available for distribution, even if the thirty day
deadline has passed. On the other hand, if a debtor simply prefers
to delay the first payment until an order is entered confirming the
plan, a court generally should not permit a moratorium.
Code section 1326(a)(2) protects the debtor when the trustee re-
ceives payments before the court confirms the Chapter 13 plan.26 7
Under this subsection, the trustee must hold any payments until
the court either confirms or denies the plan.268 If the court con-
firms the plan, the trustee must distribute the funds under the
terms of the plan.269 If the court does not confirm the debtor's
plan, however, and the debtor does not propose another plan which
the court confirms, two options are available: the court could con-
vert the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding,270 or it could dismiss the
proceeding on the motion of the debtor or another party in inter-
est.271 If the court dismisses the case, section 1326(a)(2) directs the
trustee to return the funds to the debtor after deducting unpaid
272administrative expenses. Unfortunately, the appropriate
treatment of the funds is unclear if the court converts the case to a
Chapter 7 proceeding.
266. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 18 Bankr. 763, 764-65 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
267. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985). The debtor also has the right to
convert the case to Chapter 7 at any time. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1982). Alternatively, the
court could convert the case to Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(d) (1982), although the court
probably would not do so because Chapter 11, like Chapter 13, also would require the court
to confirm a plan submitted by the debtor or another party in interest. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
1129 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (requirements for confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); id. §
1121 (parties eligible to file Chapter 11 plan).
271. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985). The debtor also has a right to dismissal
upon request unless the case previously was converted from Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 to
Chapter 13. Id. § 1307(b).
272. Id. § 1326(a)(2) (referring to 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985), which
governs claims for administrative expenses). This approach is consistent with section
349(b)(3) of the Code, which provides that dismissal of a bankruptcy case "revests the prop-
erty of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the
commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (1982); see, e.g., In re Groves, 27 Bankr.
866, 867-68 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
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b. Treatment of Funds After Conversion to Chapter 7
Conversion of a case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 "does not
effect a change in the date of the filing of the petition, the com-
mencement of the case, or the order for relief, '273 except with re-
spect to a limited number of specifically enumerated items.274
None of these exceptions apply to the determination of what con-
stitutes property of the debtor's estate under either Chapter 13 or
other parts of the Code.215 In Chapter 13 cases, section 1306(a)(2)
specifically includes in the estate "earnings from services per-
formed by the debtor after the commencement of the case. "276
Outside Chapter 13, however, section 541(a)(6) provides that a
debtor's earnings from services rendered after the commencement
of the case are not property of the estate.1 7 Because neither the
definition of "commencement of the case" nor the provisions gov-
erning property of the estate are affected by a conversion from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, and because section 541(a)(6) applies
once the case is taken out of Chapter 13, the debtor's postpetition
earnings do not appear to be property of the estate after a conver-
sion to Chapter 7.
Notwithstanding this statutory directive, some courts have held
that funds held by a trustee in a case which was converted from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 before a plan was confirmed are property
of the Chapter 7 estate.7R These courts have relied on section 348
and its directive that a conversion "does not effect a change in the
date of . . .the commencement of the case. '27 9 They reason that
once the case has been commenced, section 1306 operates to bring
postpetition earnings of the debtor into the property of the estate,
and section 348 does not operate to reverse that action. The short-
coming of this approach, however, is that it does not distinguish
273. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1982).
274. See id. § 348(b)-(c).
275. See id. (enumeration does not include sections 1306 or 541).
276. Id. § 1306(a)(2).
277. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985); see also In re Fitzsinmons, 725 F.2d
1208, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1984) (an individual's postpetition earnings are excluded from bank-
ruptcy estates under section 541(a)(6) of the Code, except in Chapter 13 cases).
278. In re Wanderlich, 36 Bankr. 710, 715 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); see In re Stinson, 27
Bankr. 18, 20-21 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982).
279. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1982).
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between an estate in Chapter 13 and an estate in Chapter 7. After
conversion, the former Chapter 13 case no longer exists. Instead, a
Chapter 7 proceeding effectively commences when the Chapter 13
petition is filed. Because section 1306 has no application to a
Chapter 7 case, section 541 should determine what constitutes
property of the bankruptcy estate. Under section 541, a debtor's
postpetition earnings are not included in the bankruptcy estate.28 0
If the court confirms the debtor's Chapter 13 plan before the
case is converted to Chapter 7, however, the treatment of property
held by the trustee after conversion would be different because
confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan "bind[s] the debtor
and each creditor."' 28' As a result, the Chapter 13 trustee must dis-
tribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the terms of the con-
firmed plan. Conversion does not affect the trustee's obligation.28 2
After conversion, the Chapter 13 trustee cannot turn the funds
over to the Chapter 7 trustee or return the funds to the debtor as
exempt property because these alternatives were not included in
the confirmed Chapter 13 plan.2 8 If additional postconversion
earnings inadvertently are paid to the former Chapter 13 trustee,
however, the trustee must return these funds to the debtor because
they do not constitute property of the Chapter 7 estate.28 4
By filing a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor effectively asserts a will-
ingness to repay creditors from future income only according to the
terms of the plan. If the court does not confirm the plan and the
debtor converts the case to Chapter 7, the debtor effectively as-
serts an unwillingness to allow creditors any recovery from the
debtor's future income. A court which held in such a case that
funds paid to the Chapter 13 trustee before conversion were prop-
erty of the Chapter 7 estate would override the debtor's choice.
The definition of "property of the estate" set out in section 541 of
280. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
281. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1982); see, e.g., In re Giambitti, 27 Bankr. 492, 493 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1983).
282. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(a), 1327(a) (1982).
283. But cf. Bankr. Rule 1019(5), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984) (directing the Chapter 13 trus-
tee to turn over all property of the estate to the Chapter 7 trustee). Arguably, however, the
estate referred to in Rule 1019(5) is the Chapter 7 estate, and it would not include
postbankruptcy earnings held by the Chapter 13 trustee.
284. See In re Richardson, 20 Bankr. 490, 492 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the Code, and the concept of a fresh start which the definition em-
bodies, are inconsistent with such an action. Instead, the Code's
provisions and policies demand that a Chapter 13 trustee who
holds funds representing a debtor's postpetition earnings must re-
turn these funds to the debtor if the debtor converts the case to
Chapter 7 before the court confirms the Chapter 13 plan.285
The new thirty day deadline for commencement of payments
under a Chapter 13 plan could increase the number of cases which
present questions concerning the treatment of postbankruptcy
earnings after conversion to Chapter 7. The number of potential
problems is increased further by the new requirement that Chapter
13 trustees "ensure that the debter commences making timely pay-
ments under Section 1326. 1286 If the court does not confirm the
plan, the debtor has an absolute right to convert the case to Chap-
ter 7.287 As a result, the number of cases in which a Chapter 13
trustee holds a debtor's funds although no plan has been confirmed
and the case has been converted to Chapter 7 may increase
significantly.
4. Confirmation of the Debtor's Plan
Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code governs confirmation of
the debtor's plan.2"' The bankruptcy court must confirm any
Chapter 13 plan that meets all the requirements of section
1325(a).289 Before the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, these require-
ments were: (1) compliance with the provisions of Chapter 13 and
other applicable Code provisions,2 0 (2) proposal of the plan in
285. In contrast to a dismissal, after which the trustee can deduct administrative ex-
penses, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1326(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985), no provision authorizes the trustee to
deduct administrative expenses before returning funds after a conversion to Chapter 7.
286. Id. § 1302(b)(5). Trustees can meet this obligation through the enforcement mecha-
nisms of section 1307(c), which allow the trustee to seek conversion or dismissal of the case
if the debtor does not make timely payments. Id. § 1307(c)(4).
287. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1982).
288. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See generally W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS,
supra note 180, at §§ 11.01-.12 (discussing the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans).
289. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); see, e.g., Kitchens v. Georgia R.R.
Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885, 887 (11th Cir. 1983); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 195
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
290. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (1982).
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good faith,29l (3) a showing that the plan is in the creditors' best
interests,22 (4) proper treatment of secured claims,293 and (5) fea-
sibility.29 4 In addition, the original version of section 1325 required
the debtor to pay all necessary fees and charges before the court
confirmed the plan.295
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act did not change the require-
ments for confirmation that were listed in section 1325(a). Con-
gress added a new subsection (b) to section 1325, however, which
significantly altered the requirements for confirmation.296 Under
the new subsection, the court may not confirm a debtor's plan if an
unsecured creditor or the trustee objects to it unless "the value of
the property to be distributed under the plan on account of [the
claims of objecting creditors] is not less than the amount of such
claim[s,] or [unless] the plan provides that all of the debtor's pro-
jected disposable income [for the next three years] will be applied
to make payments under the plan. '297
The impetus for the change in confirmation standards for Chap-
ter 13 plans presumably was the number of zero or nominal pay-
ment Chapter 13 plans which debtors had proposed. Many courts
had confirmed Chapter 13 plans in which the debtors offered to
pay either nothing or only a very small percentage of their claims,
although other courts had withheld confirmation, holding that
these plans violated the "good faith" requirement of section
1325(a)(3). 95 Courts which relied on the good faith requirement to
withhold confirmation of zero or nominal payment plans could do
so only if they construed the requirement in a quantitative as well
291. Id. § 1325(a)(3).
292. See id. § 1325(a)(4).
293. See id. § 1325(a)(5).
294. Id. § 1325(a)(6).
295. Id. § 1325(a)(2).
296. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985).
297. Id.
298. Compare In re Johnson, 6 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980) (confirmation of a
nominal payment plan) and In re Berry, 5 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (same) with
In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980) (denying confirmation of a nominal
payment plan) and In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (same). For an
analysis of cases construing the good faith requirement, see Cyr, supra note 10, or Van
Baalen, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13-What Price the 'Better Discharge?, 35 OKLA. L.
REv. 455 (1982).
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as qualitative manner."' 9 The confusion created by the disparate
treatment of the good faith requirement was resolved only after
extensive appellate consideration.3 00 These opinions did not pro-
hibit the confirmation of nominal payment Chapter 13 plans, but
they did make confirmation more difficult.3 01 The evolution of the
good faith standard had controlled the zero and nominal payment
plan problem to a great extent. The new subsection which Con-
gress added in 1984, however, nearly will eliminate the problem.302
Under the new subsection, a bankruptcy court may not confirm
a nominal or zero payment plan in the face of a creditor objection
unless the debtor's disposable income is too low to provide more
than a nominal amount to pay creditors during the following three
years.3 03 The new subsection imposes little risk on a creditor who
files an objection to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. If the court
overrules the objection and confirms the plan, the creditor will re-
ceive no less than what the debtor originally proposed. On the
other hand, if the court agrees that the debtor can pay more, the
court must deny confirmation until the debtor increases the size of
the proposed payments. If a creditor holds even the slightest suspi-
cion that the debtor could pay more under the Chapter 13 plan,
therefore, the creditor has every incentive to object to
confirmation.
A creditor's objection to a Chapter 13 plan is not totally without
risk because the debtor could react to a denial of confirmation by
299. E.g., In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
300. See In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1983); Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344 (10th
Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 708 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1983); Kitchens v.
Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Eustus, 695
F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whe-
lan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Goeb v. Heid, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); Ravenot v.
Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
301. The courts in Kitchens v. Georgia R. R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885, 888, and
United States v. Eustus, 695 F.2d 311, 317, cited In re Bellgraph, 4 Bankr. 421 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1980), as an example of a confirmable nominal payment plan. In Bellgraph, the
debtor was a 56-year-old widow and mother of seven who sought Chapter 13 relief to save
her home from foreclosure. The court noted that the nominal payments proposed by the
debtor constituted not just her "best efforts," as some courts had suggested were necessary
for confirmation, but in fact represented a "super effort." The courts in Kitchens, and Eus-
tus, however, did not indicate whether less strenuous efforts would permit confirmation of
nominal payment plans.
302. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985).
303. See id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
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seeking dismissal of the case 0 4 or a conversion to Chapter 7 pro-
ceedings. 05 Because the Code contains protections for creditors in
these situations, however, neither alternative is particularly attrac-
tive to the debtor or devastating to the creditor. If the debtor seeks
dismissal, the Code reinstates the creditor's state law collection
rights. 06 If the debtor seeks conversion, the court might not per-
mit the debtor to proceed under Chapter 7,307 and even if the court
did allow conversion, the creditor could collect from the sale and
distribution of assets under that chapter. Also, a debtor who origi-
nally chose to file under Chapter 13 because he owned significant
nonexempt property would not be tempted to seek conversion. In
other circumstances, such as when a debtor owned very little non-
exempt property but had substantial expected future income, the
court likely would not allow the debtor to proceed under Chapter
7, leaving only the Chapter 13 alternative.308 Considering all the
factors, a creditor is likely to refrain from objecting to a proposed
Chapter 13 plan only if the debtor is proposing payments that
meet the specific requirements of section 1325(b). 0 9
In effect, the new requirements of section 1325(b) have been
added to the six enumerated requirements in section 1325(a) as
proper grounds for objection to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.
Congress further confirmed this conclusion by amending section
1325(a) to provide explicitly that confirmation of a debtor's plan
also is subject to the creditors' and trustee's right to object to
confirmation under section 1325(b).3 10 A court, therefore, may not
confirm the debtor's plan unless it meets the new requirements of
section 1325(b)-not even if the debtor proposes the plan in good
304. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(b) (West Supp. 1985).
305. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1982).
306. Id. § 349(b). For an interesting discussion of the interplay between the bankruptcy
system and the state law collection system, see LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics
of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311.
307. The court could find that the debtor's actions constituted a "substantial abuse" of
the provisions of Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1985); see supra notes 24-31
and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 24-31, 307 and accompanying text.
309. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 297 and accompanying text.
310. The new section 1325(a) provides explicitly that the court must confirm a plan if it
meets the six enumerated requirements "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)." 11
U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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faith, meets the best interest of creditors test, and otherwise com-
plies with section 1325(a). Consequently, section 1325(b) and the
concepts of full payment of claims and application of disposable
income on which it relies will become central to the confirmation
decisions of bankruptcy courts. Because of their importance, this
Article now examines these requirements in greater detail.
a. Discounting Debtor Payments
Section 1325(b)(1)(A) provides that the court must withhold
confirmation of the plan unless "the value of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of [the objecting creditor's]
claim is not less than the amount of such claim. 3 11 Although this
provision appears straightforward, it is subject to many possible
interpretations. One of the most important interpretational
problems concerns the effect the discount value of money should
have when the court compares the value of the property to be dis-
tributed against the value of the creditor's "allowed unsecured
claim. 3 12
Usually a court will not have to add unmatured interest to the
value of a creditor's claim.313 Creditors are entitled to interest only
if the debtor is not considered insolvent because the value of the
nonexempt portion of the bankruptcy estate exceeds the value of
all claims. 14 In the vast majority of cases, the debtor is insolvent
and is not required under Chapter 13 to pay interest on unsecured
claims. The court may have trouble determining the value of the
property to be distributed, however, because it must compare the
value of the property to the value of the claim "as of the effective
date of the plan" 1 5 to determine whether it can confirm the plan.
For example, if the plan proposes installment payments, it must
provide an appropriate discount rate so the present value of the
311. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(A).
312. See id. § 1325(b)(1). The Code provisions governing the allowance of claims are con-
tained in 11 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
313. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982); Turner v. Maupin, 26 Bankr. 987, 989 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983); cf. In re Redeker, 27 Bankr. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (solvent Chap-
ter 13 debtors must pay unsecured claims in full, including interest based on Treasury Bill
interest rates).
315. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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property to be distributed will equal or exceed the value of the
claim.3 16
Although the exact meaning of "the effective date of the plan"
may be disputed,3 1 7 the phrase undeniably requires the court to
determine the present value of the property described in section
1325.318 In simple mathematical terms, ten monthly payments of
$10 each will not pay a $100 claim in full for the purposes of sec-
tion 1325(b)(1)(A) because the present value of the payments does
not equal $100.311 To judge whether a proposed plan complies with
the statute, therefore, the court must face the issue of how to de-
termine the appropriate discount rate for these payments. This de-
termination involves considerations similar to those used to decide
whether the debtor's plan meets the best interest of creditors test
of section 1325(a)(4).3 20
The courts have failed to reach a consensus concerning what dis-
count rate is most appropriate. Many courts simply have made
conclusory determinations in particular cases that the proposed
discount rate either was or was not sufficient to satisfy the best
interests of creditors test.3 21 The cases in which courts have
adopted a specific discount rate have not produced a leading can-
didate for general application to either the best interest of credi-
tors test or the present value of payments test.32 2 Regardless of
316. See W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, supra note 180, § 11.07, at S-71 to -72 (Supp. 1984)
(addendum to n.146).
317. The Bankruptcy Code does not define "the effective date of the plan." Ken Klee, one
of the staff attorneys who helped draft the Bankruptcy Code, has suggested that the effec-
tive date of a plan is the day after the order confirming the plan becomes final. Klee, All
You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133, 137 n.24 (1979).
318. See In re Martin, 17 Bankr. 924, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
319. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) T 1325.01-36, -37 (15th ed. 1985).
320. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982).
321. See, e.g., In re Worthen, 24 Bankr. 532, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (court did not
consider any particular interest rate, but noted that a solvent debtor's plan would not meet
best interest of creditors test if it proposed to pay claims in full over five years without any
interest on the unpaid balance); General Fin. Co. v. Powell, 2 Bankr. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1980) (court did not consider any particular interest rate, but noted that unsecured
creditors would receive nothing in a Chapter 7 case, so any payment to them under Chapter
13 would meet the best interest of creditors test).
322. See, e.g., In re Wilheim, 29 Bankr. 912, 913 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983) (courts used a 12%
discount rate, apparently based on the statutory judgment rate in effect when the debtor
filed the petition); In re Jewell, 25 Bankr. 44, 46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (court found the 52-
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which discount rate a court chooses, however, it should apply the
same standard to both the best interest test and the present value
of payments test.
b. Determining a Consumer Debtor's Disposable Income
If the debtor is unable to pay unsecured claims in full, section
1325(b)(1)(B) still allows the court to confirm the debtor's plan if
the plan "provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable in-
come to be received in the three-year period beginning on the date
that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to
make payments under the plan. '3 23 To apply this section, the court
must determine "the debtor's projected disposable income" for the
next three years. If the debtor's plan proposes to apply all of this
disposable income to plan payments, the court cannot deny confir-
mation as long as the plan meets the other requirements of section
1325(a).
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act defines "disposable income"
as "income which is received by the debtor and which is not rea-
sonably necessary to be expended-(A) for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; or (B) if the
debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation and operation of such
business. '324 The primary issue associated with this definition
arises when the court attempts to determine what amount of in-
come is "reasonably necessary" to support the debtor and the
debtor's dependents. The court generally can ascertain the debtor's
gross income from reliable sources other than the debtor.3 25
week Treasury Bill rate to be an appropriate interest rate, based on its use by financial
institutions to set the rate on all-savers' certificates); In re Williams, 3 Bankr. 728, 732
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (court used the statutory rate of interest on judgments and suggested
that it would be an appropriate interest rate for all unsecured claims).
323. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
324. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
325. The debtor's employer can be ordered to pay some or all of the debtor's income to
the Chapter 13 trustee, and therefore probably could be required to disclose information on
the debtor's income. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) (West Supp. 1985). The debtor's income tax
returns also should give acceptable information concerning the debtor's previous income.
Creditors could obtain this information using available discovery procedures, and subse-
quently could make the information available to the court. See infra note 329. The court
also could rely on the debtor's own Chapter 13 Statement, which will contain the debtor's
1985]
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Independent verification of the debtor's expenses, however, is not
always possible, which forces the court to rely primarily on the list
of expenses contained in the debtor's Chapter 13 statement. 26 As a
result, the debtor often can establish the categories and the
amounts of his own expenses, and he may be able to divert the
attention of the court and other parties from some potentially
questionable expenses. The debtor cannot slip all questionable ex-
penses through the process without contest, but if an expense is
challenged he at least has made the first "offer" in the negotia-
tions, which may affect the final determination significantly.
27
Some other controls do exist on the debtor's ability to assert the
value of claimed expenses. For example, creditors and trustees may
question the debtor directly concerning claimed expenses at the
hearing on confirmation of the plan.32s Also, items such as the
debtor's checking account records or other documentation of
prebankruptcy living expenses are discoverable and can be used to
check the debtor's assertions concerning expenses. 29 The effort
assertions concerning current and future income. See Official Bankr. Form 10, 11 U.S.C.A.
(West 1984); Bankr. Rule 1007(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984) (requiring all Chapter 13 debt-
ors to file Form 10).
326. Official Bankr. Form 10, 4(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984); see, e.g., In re Strong, 26
Bankr. 814, 816-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
327. An American Bar Association subcommittee noted a similar problem in many Chap-
ter 13 repayment proposals, caused by the absence of definitive standards for minimum
repayments of debts. The subcommittee noted that the debtor's ability to set the repayment
level
is particularly significant because of the litigation-oriented approach of the
Code to resolving disputes. It has been noted that the economics of consumer
bankruptcies are such that consumer creditors simply cannot afford to litigate
these issues in typical cases. In other words, the absence of standards provides
a great benefit to the person who applies the standard in the first instance (the
debtor), and a significant handicap to the party that must litigate to change it
(the creditor). When such litigation is not feasible, the absence of a definitive
standard is tantamount to letting the debtor set the standard and to making
that standard nonreviewable. In other words, it is essential that any standard
be sufficiently definite so that it provides a clear guide to what the law re-
quires, and so that case by case litigation is not necessary for the standard to
be applied fairly.
ABA Report, supra note 165, at 258-59.
328. See, e.g., In re Strong, 26 Bankr. 814, 817 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (creditor objected
to debtor's claimed expenses for medical and dental care, transportation, haircuts, and
housing).
329. Objections to confirmation are "contested matters" which are governed by Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9014. Bankr. Rule 3020(b)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984). Rule 9014 provides
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and expense required to challenge a debtor's assertions of ex-
penses, however, may be prohibitive.
Even if the trustee or a creditor obtains evidence which contra-
dicts the debtor's assertions, discrepancies in the amounts alone
will not always convince the court to withhold confirmation of the
debtor's plan.33 0 Evaluating the credibility of the debtor's stated
expenses is only the first step in the bankruptcy court's determina-
tion of whether to confirm a debtor's proposed plan notwithstand-
ing the objection of the trustee or a creditor. The court also must
make a qualitative judgment concerning whether the expenses
which the debtor expects to incur are "reasonably necessary...
for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor." '331
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act provides any significant guidance to
the bankruptcy courts concerning the reasonableness issue. Courts
which must determine the reasonableness of a Chapter 13 debtor's
projected expenses, however, can look for guidance in cases which
construe several of the categories of exempt property in section
522(d) of the Code, because these exemptions also are limited to
amounts "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
any dependent of the debtor. 33 2 Courts which have considered the
debtor's reasonable needs for the purposes of section 522(d) gener-
ally have suggested that the debtor's prebankruptcy lifestyle does
that Bankruptcy Rule 7034 applies in contested matters. Id. Rule 9014. Rule 7034, in turn,
adopts FED. R. Civ. P. 34. Id. Rule 7034. Under FED. R. CIv. P. 34, creditors or the trustee
can require a debtor to produce documentary evidence of claimed expenses. A debtor's
checking account records presumably would be documentary evidence covered by the rule,
and generally would provide an accurate and relatively complete picture of a debtor's living
expenses.
330. The court, however, could deny confirmation to a debtor who misrepresented ex-
penses by holding that the plan was not "proposed in good faith." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
(1982); see Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Eustus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193,
197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
331. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985).
332. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), (11)(B), (11)(C), (11)(E) (1982). In a number of decisions,
for example, courts have considered what amount is "reasonably necessary" for the purposes
of the exemption in section 522(d)(10)(E), which attaches, inter alia, to payments from pen-
sion and profit sharing plans. See, e.g., In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983);
In re Kochell, 31 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); Warren v. Taff, 10 Bankr. 101
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
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not limit the court's postbankruptcy determination of reasonable-
ness.33 3 These courts have emphasized that exempt property
should be sufficient only to "sustain basic needs, not related to [a
debtor's] former status in society or the lifestyle to which he is
accustomed. ' '31 4 Although the determination of reasonableness in
many of the exemption cases involved circumstances which raised
significantly different issues than would be raised by an objection
to a Chapter 13 debtor's claimed expenses,3 35 the same general ap-
proach also seems appropriate for the determination of a debtor's
reasonably necessary living expenses under a Chapter 13 plan. The
court should not permit a debtor to maintain the extravagant lifes-
tyle which may have led to the need for bankruptcy relief in the
first place.
The expenses most likely to be scrutinized closely under section
1325(b)(1)(B) are the debtor's nonhousing expenses. Before the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act, some bankruptcy courts already
closely scrutinized these expenses by applying the good faith re-
quirement of section 1325(a)(3).336 The debtor's housing expenses
may present less opportunity for debtor manipulation, but they
also may present other more difficult problems. In most cases, a
monthly rental or mortgage payment is the largest single expendi-
ture in the debtor's budget. If other directly related expenses are
included, such as utility costs and taxes, the expense grows even
larger. If the debtor resides in large or lavish quarters, the court
might feel compelled by section 1325(b)(1)(B) to withhold confir-
mation of the debtor's plan until the debtor moves to less expen-
sive quarters.
333. In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 553 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Kochell, 31 Bankr.
139, 140 (Bankr. W. D. Wis. 1983); Warren v. Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981).
334. Warren v. Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
335. For example, in many exemption cases the court was considering the appropriate
amount of an exemption for a debtor's pension or profit sharing plan. See supra note 332. In
such cases, courts may consider the debtor's age and life expectancy to determine whether
the debtor can replenish the pension fund in the future. See, e.g., In re Clark, 18 Bankr.
824, 826-28 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). This issue would not be relevant to the determination
of reasonable expenses under Chapter 13.
336. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982); see, e.g., In re Strong, 26 Bankr. 814, 817 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1983) (excessive transportation, insurance, and haircut expenses); In re Brecken-
ridge, 12 Bankr. 159, 160 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (excessive tithing); In re Cadogan, 4
Bankr. 598, 599-600 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980) (excessive tithing).
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The court should temper its decision regarding the reasonable
amount of the debtor's living expenses, however, by considering
other factors which may support the continuation of living ex-
penses that ordinarily would be considered excessive. For example,
if the debtor had to sell a residence in a tight real estate market,
he probably would lose a significant amount of equity in the
home.33 7 Also, the debtor's moving costs could outweigh the sav-
ings realized by reduced monthly rental or mortgage payments.
The debtor also may have a legitimate interest in staying in a par-
ticular location to obtain noneconomic benefits such as a superior
school system. When considering the reasonableness of a debtor's
projected housing costs, therefore, bankruptcy courts should con-
sider not only the gross reduction in living expenses, but also the
potential loss of equity, moving expenses, and noneconomic costs
which any move would entail.
c. Determining a Business Debtor's Disposable Income
Bankruptcy courts may encounter difficulty in determining pro-
jected disposable income not only for consumer debtors, but for
business debtors as well. The Code defines a business debtor's
disposable income as the amount in excess of that reasonably "nec-
essary for the continuation, preservation and operation of [the
debtor's] business."338 Because this definition is stated disjunc-
tively from the definition of a nonbusiness debtor's disposable in-
come,3 39 a court could conclude that a business debtor's disposable
337. The sale of a residence at less than fair market value may work against creditors'
best interests as well as the debtor's. Chapter 13 debtors must pay unsecured creditors at
least the present value of the nonexempt portion of their residences. See 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1982). Any reduction in a debtor's equity could reduce the amount available to
pay creditors.
338. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985). This definition applies "if the debtor
is engaged in business," which, according to another applicable section of Chapter 13, means
that the debtor "is self-employed and incurs trade credit in the production of income from
such employment." 11 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982).
339. The definition of disposable income "if the debtor is engaged in business" is stated
in section 1325(b)(2)(B), separately from the general definition stated in section
1325(b)(2)(A). See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
income should be determined solely from the debtor's business ex-
penses. Under Chapter 13, however, business debtors are individu-
als 340 who incur personal living expenses. The courts, therefore,
should consider not only whether a business debtor's salary is a
reasonably necessary expense of the business,3 4' but also whether
the debtor's personal living expenses are excessive.3 42 Failure to
scrutinize a business debtor's personal living expenses could pro-
duce anomalous results. For example, an annual salary of $100,000
might be a reasonably necessary expenditure for the debtor's busi-
ness which legitimately should operate to reduce the debtor's busi-
ness income, but the debtor should not be able to use that salary
for unnecessary personal expenses such as extended vacations or
substantial purchases of lottery tickets.
Another interpretational problem associated with the disposable
business income provision is that it permits debtors to deduct only
"expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and
operation of [a] business 3 43 from disposable income. If a court
read the definition strictly, it might disallow expenditures for ex-
pansion of a debtor's existing business. Even under this interpreta-
tion, however, a debtor facing this situation could seek approval of
expansion plans through alternate Code provisions such as the sec-
tion which permits debtors to use estate property other than in the
ordinary course of business after notice and a hearing.344 Using this
provision, the debtor could obtain approval for expansion plans af-
ter notice to creditors and a hearing on the issue even if the court
does not consider expansion expenses necessary for the "opera-
tion" of the business. The court's determination concerning the use
of the funds outside the ordinary course of the debtor's business
would be binding on creditors and the trustee, and would reduce
the debtor's disposable income for section 1325 purposes.3 45
340. Only individuals are eligible for Chapter 13 relief. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
341. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
342. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A); see supra notes 323-37 and accompanying text.
343. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(B).
344. See id. § 363(b)(1) (providing that a trustee, "after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate"). A
Chapter 13 debtor is authorized to exercise this power by 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982) (giving a
Chapter 13 debtor "the rights and powers of a trustee under [section] 363(b)").
345. Even if a creditor objected to the proposed use or sale of the property, appealed an
adverse bankruptcy court ruling, and got the ruling reversed, the reversal probably would be
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Because business cases under Chapter 13 are relatively rare,""
early decisions which construe the new Chapter 13 provisions gov-
erning business debtors' disposable income could set more signifi-
cant precedents than counterpart decisions in the nonbusiness
area. Courts faced with a lack of bankruptcy precedent could look
to nonbankruptcy decisions concerning the business judgment rule
to determine the reasonableness of business expenses in Chapter
13 cases. 347 Alternatively, the courts could develop reasonableness
standards unique to bankruptcy. In any event, fewer opportunities
will arise for other courts to challenge the approaches set out in
early decisions, and development in this area will be slow.
5. Modification of the Debtor's Plan
Congress also included a provision in the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments Act that will permit creditors to propose modifications to
confirmed Chapter 13 plans.3 48 Although an order of confirmation
binds creditors to the provisions of the plan,3 49 the trustee or the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim may propose modifications to
the plan once it has been confirmed.3 5 0 These modifications may
of little use to the creditor unless any action on the bankruptcy court order was stayed
pending the appeal. Section 363(m) of the Code provides that "reversal or modification of
[the bankruptcy court's order under section 363(b)] does not affect the validity of a sale or
lease under [bankruptcy court] authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such
property in good faith." 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (1982).
346. Of the 102,201 debtor-initiated Chapter 13 cases filed in the twelve month period
that ended June 30, 1983, only 7746 were filed by individuals engaged in business. See supra
note 202.
347. See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 1039-1044 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) (discussing the business judgment rule).
348. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1329(a) (West Supp. 1985). Only the debtor may propose a plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1321 (1982); see, e.g., In re Fluharty, 23 Bankr. 426, 428 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982);
In re Waldrep, 20 Bankr. 248, 250 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982); In re Frost, 19 Bankr. 804,
809 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). Debtors also are the only individuals entitled to seek any
preconfirmation modifications of a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982). Creditors may be able to
force the debtor to modify a plan before confirmation through objections based on noncom-
pliance with the requirements of section 1325. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 1979 & Supp.
1985); see supra notes 288-347 and accompanying text. If the debtor's plan is not objection-
able under section 1325, however, creditors have no power to propose modifications to the
plan before it is confirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982); In re Fluharty, 23 Bankr. 426, 429
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
349. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1982).
350. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1329(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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entail increases in the amount to be paid on particular claims or
reductions in the time period for payments under the plan. 5'
This amendment to the postconfirmation modification provision
logically follows from the notion that debtors can be forced to ap-
ply all of their disposable income to the Chapter 13 plan for a
stated period.3 52 If a debtor's postconfirmation income is greater
than expected or expenses are less than expected, actual disposable
income will exceed projected disposable income, and the confirmed
plan would not require the debtor to apply all disposable income
to plan payments. In such instances, creditors should be able to
seek modifications of the original plan to reflect the debtor's actual
financial status.
The primary difficulty faced by the trustee and creditors who
may seek modifications under the new provision involves obtaining
information concerning the debtor's postpetition income and ex-
penses.3 53 The Code only requires the debtor to file a proposed
budget at the beginning of the proceedings 54 and to file a supple-
mental statement if the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to ac-
quire certain narrowly defined types of property within 180 days
after filing the petition.3 5 The debtor need not report increases in
income, reductions in expenses, or even the good fortune of win-
ning a state lottery.3 56 Given these obstacles, creditors and trustees
351. See id. Creditors also could propose decreases in the amount of the debtor's pay-
ments or extension of the repayment period, but such creditor action is unlikely.
352. See id. § 1325(b)(1) (requiring for confirmation that the debtor either pay unsecured
claims in full or apply all disposable income to fund the plan). The amendment strongly
suggests that Congress did not intend Chapter 13 debtors to retain any portion of their
disposable income during the term of the proceedings unless creditors are paid in full. See
generally supra notes 288-347 and accompanying text (describing requirements for confir-
mation of a Chapter 13 plan).
353. See supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
354. See Bankr. Rule 1007(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984); Official Bankr. Form 10, 11
U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
355. See Bankr. Rule 1007(h), 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
356. Bankruptcy Rule 1007(h) requires only that the debtor report the receipt of inheri-
tances, bequests, and devises, life insurance proceeds, death benefits, or property settle-
ments obtained within 180 days after the petition was filed. Id. The lack of any disclosure
requirement for other types of property, however, does not indicate necessarily that such
property does not belong in the bankruptcy estate. Cf. In re Miller, 16 Bankr. 790, 791
(Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (debtor won a lottery before he filed the bankruptcy petition; court
held that prize was property of the estate even though a portion of it was to be received in
the future).
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can ascertain postconfirmation changes in a debtor's disposable
income only if they act to obtain the proper information. One way
creditors and trustees can act is to request that the order confirm-
ing the plan include a provision that requires the debtor to report
income and expenses periodically to the court or the trustee. This
method would ensure that the court would have the information
needed to determine whether postconfirmation modification would
be appropriate.5 7 Nonetheless, the costs of commencing an action
to modify a confirmed plan probably will deter modification pro-
posals unless the debtor's disposable income has changed
significantly.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act significantly changed many
substantive aspects of consumer bankruptcy law. The changes
largely reflect the consumer credit industry's efforts to persuade
Congress that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 went too far in
protecting the interest of debtors at the expense of creditors. 3 8
Notwithstanding opposing testimony and commentary,3 5 9 Congress
adopted many of the consumer credit industry's proposals, and in
some instances granted even greater protection to creditor inter-
ests than the credit industry itself sought. 6
The comments of several Congressmen on the floors of the
House and Senate indicated a strong belief that the perceived pro-
debtor orientation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was re-
sponsible in significant part for the increased bankruptcy filings in
357. The severe sanctions available to courts if debtors supply false information probably
would guarantee compliance with such an order. If a debtor did supply false information,
the court could revoke confirmation of the debtor's plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982), or
revoke the debtor's discharge, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(e) (West Supp. 1985). The court also
could order dismissal of the case or force conversion to Chapter 7 by holding that the false
information supplied by the debtor constituted a "material default by the debtor with re-
spect to a term of a confirmed plan." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(b)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
358. See, e.g., Evans & Johnson, Proposals for Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1117 (1982); ABA Report, supra note 165, at 329; Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 6-
185 (testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer, Jonathan M. Landers, Paul J. Pfeilsticker, and Fred
M. Hader).
359. See, e.g., Hearings, Part I, supra note 7, at 185-99 (testimony and statement of
Professor King); Limiting Access, supra note 11, at 1103-38; Schuclunan & Rhorer, supra
note 31.
360. See, e.g., supra note 128.
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1980 and thereafter.3 6' The claimed empirical support for this
position 6 2 has been discredited, however, both by academicians 363
and by the General Accounting Office.364 As a result, the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments Act may have been based on an overstate-
ment of the problems under the 1978 Code, and significant inade-
quacies and injustices may occur when the amended Code
provisions are applied.
Congress could commission further study of consumer bank-
ruptcy filings to detect whatever increase or decrease in consumer
bankruptcy filings may occur, to gather empirical data on the ef-
fectiveness of each substantive Code change, and to identify fur-
ther refinements which may be needed. Congress, however, is un-
likely to be interested in consumer bankruptcy issues so soon after
the extensive reforms of 1978 and 1984. Because Congress most
likely will not make additional significant changes soon, interested
individuals should be aware of the weaknesses of the new Code
changes and the alleged empirical support and should plan their
actions accordingly.
361. See 130 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 130
CONG. REc. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
362. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
364. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 31.
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